<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper is an interdisciplinary analysis of the benefits and limits of political competition. We start from the economic theory of monopoly and extend its implications on matters concerning political action. If the state is defined as the institution that holds the monopoly on coercion over a given territory, are the democratic selection process (internal political competition) and the possibility open to an economic agent to leave for more economically free jurisdictions (international political competition) enough to temper its reach? By referring to the inherent limits that plague collective action, voter rational ignorance, and the possibility of redistributing benefits and incumbent decision-maker collaboration when it comes to trading votes, we argue that democratic competition cannot be considered an effective restraint against political discretion. Because of this, we consider that international political competition can offer better protection against political action. However, even the possibility of voting with one’s feet or observing the political milieu in another territory become manageable if political decision-makers decide to collude at the international level. Also, emigration is an economically costly and psychologically exacting decision that ultimately implies choosing between two state-controlled jurisdictions. Therefore, even the choice of voting with one’s feet is a second-best solution that, in practice, might not prove to be an effective restraint on the state’s monopoly discretion.</p></abstract>

This paper is an interdisciplinary analysis of the benefits and limits of political competition. We start from the economic theory of monopoly and extend its implications on matters concerning political action. If the state is defined as the institution that holds the monopoly on coercion over a given territory, are the democratic selection process (internal political competition) and the possibility open to an economic agent to leave for more economically free jurisdictions (international political competition) enough to temper its reach? By referring to the inherent limits that plague collective action, voter rational ignorance, and the possibility of redistributing benefits and incumbent decision-maker collaboration when it comes to trading votes, we argue that democratic competition cannot be considered an effective restraint against political discretion. Because of this, we consider that international political competition can offer better protection against political action. However, even the possibility of voting with one’s feet or observing the political milieu in another territory become manageable if political decision-makers decide to collude at the international level. Also, emigration is an economically costly and psychologically exacting decision that ultimately implies choosing between two state-controlled jurisdictions. Therefore, even the choice of voting with one’s feet is a second-best solution that, in practice, might not prove to be an effective restraint on the state’s monopoly discretion.

Voting with Your Brain or Heart, Hands or Feet? An Enquiry in the Microeconomics of Intra- and Inter- National Political Competition

The Bucharest University of Economic Studies

Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

This paper is an interdisciplinary analysis of the benefits and limits of political competition. We start from the economic theory of monopoly and extend its...

Voting with Your Brain or Heart, Hands or Feet? An Enquiry in the Microeconomics of Intra- and Inter- National Political Competition

Pubblicato online: 29 nov 2019

Pagine: 889 - 899

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2019-0078

Parole chiave
state, political competition, monopoly, institutional competition, praxeology

© 2019 Matei-Alexandru Apăvăloaei et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Voting with Your Brain or Heart, Hands or Feet? An Enquiry in the Microeconomics of Intra- and Inter- National Political Competition

Pubblicato online: 29 nov 2019

Pagine: 889 - 899

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2019-0078

Parole chiavestate, political competition, monopoly, institutional competition, praxeology

© 2019 Matei-Alexandru Apăvăloaei et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
state, political competition, monopoly, institutional competition, praxeology