<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>As early as 1905, Husserl made clear that, when it comes to aesthetic consideration, our “interest” is not directed toward the existence of the object as such, but rather toward the object’s way of appearance. Husserl’s famous letter to Hofmannsthal (1907) goes as far as to suggest that any existential concerns are potentially even a menace to the purity of aesthetic experience. This position clearly echoes Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment presented in the third <italic>Critique</italic>, notably as regards the notion of disinterestedness. However, this is not tantamount to claiming that aesthetic attitude implies the suspension of all interest: this paper aims to show that it would be more appropriate to discuss it in terms of a change of interest: from an existential interest to an axiological one.</p>
</abstract>

As early as 1905, Husserl made clear that, when it comes to aesthetic consideration, our “interest” is not directed toward the existence of the object as such, but rather toward the object’s way of appearance. Husserl’s famous letter to Hofmannsthal (1907) goes as far as to suggest that any existential concerns are potentially even a menace to the purity of aesthetic experience. This position clearly echoes Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment presented in the third Critique, notably as regards the notion of disinterestedness. However, this is not tantamount to claiming that aesthetic attitude implies the suspension of all interest: this paper aims to show that it would be more appropriate to discuss it in terms of a change of interest: from an existential interest to an axiological one.

A Husserlian Approach to Aesthetic Experience: Existential Disinterest and Axiological Interest

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

As early as 1905, Husserl made clear that, when it comes to aesthetic consideration, our “interest” is not directed toward the existence of the object as such,...

A Husserlian Approach to Aesthetic Experience: Existential Disinterest and Axiological Interest

Pubblicato online: 05 ott 2021

Pagine: 115 - 133

Ricevuto: 11 lug 2019

Accettato: 19 lug 2019

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2019-0006

Parole chiave
Aesthetic Experience, Depiction, Value, Disinterestedness, Expression

© 2019 Claudio Rozzoni, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

A Husserlian Approach to Aesthetic Experience: Existential Disinterest and Axiological Interest

Pubblicato online: 05 ott 2021

Pagine: 115 - 133

Ricevuto: 11 lug 2019

Accettato: 19 lug 2019

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2019-0006

Parole chiaveAesthetic Experience, Depiction, Value, Disinterestedness, Expression

© 2019 Claudio Rozzoni, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Parole chiave
Aesthetic Experience, Depiction, Value, Disinterestedness, Expression