<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper discusses Gilbert Ryle’s image of philosophy as cartography in an attempt to explore the idea of a cartography of the phenomenon, confronting it with the sense it takes in Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Ryle tries to grasp the particularity of philosophical tasks as being about specific sorts of problems, not about specific sorts of objects. What is required both of a cartographer and of a philosopher is, according to him, to look at familiar spaces in wholly unusual terms. Husserlian phenomenology then, with its rediscovery of consciousness as an absolute, unbounded field, meets quite well this demand. The uncovered field of the phenomena is not a new region, opposing that of the objects as faced in the natural attitude. It is rather a completely different attitude, just as a map is not a share of the world, but a distinct orientation towards it. The phenomenon, therefore, would not be something that is there to be cartographed as much as a kind of cartography itself. A phenomenological cartography, however, is one that has its specific marks, different from those of the Rylean conception.</p></abstract>

This paper discusses Gilbert Ryle’s image of philosophy as cartography in an attempt to explore the idea of a cartography of the phenomenon, confronting it with the sense it takes in Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Ryle tries to grasp the particularity of philosophical tasks as being about specific sorts of problems, not about specific sorts of objects. What is required both of a cartographer and of a philosopher is, according to him, to look at familiar spaces in wholly unusual terms. Husserlian phenomenology then, with its rediscovery of consciousness as an absolute, unbounded field, meets quite well this demand. The uncovered field of the phenomena is not a new region, opposing that of the objects as faced in the natural attitude. It is rather a completely different attitude, just as a map is not a share of the world, but a distinct orientation towards it. The phenomenon, therefore, would not be something that is there to be cartographed as much as a kind of cartography itself. A phenomenological cartography, however, is one that has its specific marks, different from those of the Rylean conception.

Cartography of the Phenomenon and the Phenomenon as Cartography

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Cartography of the Phenomenon and the Phenomenon as Cartography"}

This paper discusses Gilbert Ryle’s image of philosophy as cartography in an attempt to explore the idea of a cartography of the phenomenon, confronting it...

Cartography of the Phenomenon and the Phenomenon as Cartography

Pubblicato online: 14 ott 2021

Pagine: 217 - 232

Ricevuto: 09 ott 2017

Accettato: 11 ott 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0012

Parole chiave
Phenomenon, Cartography, Attitude, Husserl, Ryle

© 2017 Guilherme Riscali, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Cartography of the Phenomenon and the Phenomenon as Cartography

Pubblicato online: 14 ott 2021

Pagine: 217 - 232

Ricevuto: 09 ott 2017

Accettato: 11 ott 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0012

Parole chiavePhenomenon, Cartography, Attitude, Husserl, Ryle

© 2017 Guilherme Riscali, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
Phenomenon, Cartography, Attitude, Husserl, Ryle