Mapping research on disinformation and misinformation across the Nordic countries: An integrative review

The contemporary digital sphere is going through an epistemic crisis (Benkler et al., 2018), making it increasingly difficult to determine which information can be trusted. Social media and artificial intelligence have made it simple to create and widely disseminate manipulated and artificially generated information to a large global audience. Information disorder is often used as an umbrella term to describe information phenomena including misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation (Wardle & Derakshan, 2017). These terms reflect the “widespread worry about the fragile nature of truth in public discourse and how a culture of dishonesty appears to be undermining the social relations which provide the stability for well-functioning democracies” (Maci et al., 2024: 1). Here, we mainly focus on dis- and misinformation research in a Nordic context, either conducted by researchers with a Nordic affiliation or with a Nordic focus.

Previous research has found that a geographical imbalance exists in the research field of dis- and misinformation, where research from the US and Europe is typically over-represented (Arqoub et al., 2022; Broda & Strömbäck, 2024; Ha et al., 2021), while studies on dis- and misinformation in the Global South are less frequently examined, with some exceptions (Madrid-Morales & Wasserman, 2022). Also, research on dis- and misinformation with a specific focus on the Nordic region is sparse and scattered amongst different research fields (Schmidt-Felzman, 2017). This can be problematic, since the “challenges misinformation, disinformation, and fake news pose may look different in varying parts of the world and thus require distinct solutions and countermeasures” (Broda & Strömbäck, 2024: 159). Research has demonstrated that how a society deals with dis- and misinformation is highly country-specific. In a study of six Western countries, for example, the spread of disinformation was dependent on the specific social, media, and political environment (Humprecht et al., 2021). Thus, the geographical and societal context has been of importance for our study.

Here, we have a specific focus on the five Nordic countries in the Northern region of Europe. This research agenda is important for several reasons. Studies have identified the Nordic region as particularly resilient against dis- and misinformation due to low polarisation, media systems associated with the welfare state, strong media literacy, and a high societal trust level, as noted by Humprecht and colleagues (2020) and Balčytienė and Horowitz (2023). Based on measures of seven indicators, the Nordic countries (Iceland was not included in the study) were clustered as “media supporting and more consensual” compared with countries in Southern Europe and especially the US. Nevertheless, the changed digital information environment also creates concerns in the Nordic countries. First, dis- and misinformation are described as substantial threats to liberal democracies (European Commission, 2018; Humprecht et al., 2020), and their spread online challenges public trust in information and potentially in institutions. Election periods are particularly vulnerable to the spread of false information, as the electorate makes important societal decisions based on the information available during these times (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; Hénin, 2023).

Second, the new geopolitical situation globally, and particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, impacts all the Nordic countries. The threat from Russia, both in terms of military warfare and hybrid threats, has accentuated the need to understand the increasingly problematic and complex information landscape, as well as the state and character of the Nordic societies’ resilience. Third, the Nordic countries have been described as a “relatively understudied region” regarding Russian information operations, (Eggen, 2024: 432), a gap that has become even more relevant in the current geopolitical climate. A systematic and comprehensive overview of dis- and misinformation research related to the Nordic countries is lacking. Additionally, integrative literature reviews, as employed in this study, are not particularly common in media studies. This approach allows for a broad cross-disciplinary perspective, provides new insights, and helps map future research possibilities.

The aim of this article is to review how dis- and misinformation are understood and examined through research in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. In this integrative review conducted by researchers from the five countries, we map the comparative aspects of Nordic dis- and misinformation research regarding terminology, types of studies, methods, and research development. The article is organised as follows: First, we explore the relevant literature on dis- and misinformation with a particular focus on the Nordic region. Second, we outline our material and methods, including the integrative review approach, the search strategy, selection criteria, and data material. Third, we present our findings according to our research questions. And lastly, we outline research gaps in the field and potential avenues for future research.

We consciously use the concepts of disinformation and misinformation as two overarching terms to represent different types of information manipulations. Disinformation is widely understood as deceptive content shared on purpose, produced to generate profits, pursue political goals, or cause harm or disruption – for example, hoaxes (Nielsen & Graves, 2017). We can differentiate between misinformation, which refers to the “unintentional publication of false or misleading information”, and disinformation, which means that false information is intentionally shared to cause harm (Wardle & Derakshan, 2017: 20; for a similar definition, see Pamment, 2022: 15).

Research on dis- and misinformation and terms such as fake news, propaganda, and information operations have gained traction in recent years, even though they represent older phenomena triggered by newer developments in digital technology. Previous research has zoomed in on specific topics related to dis- and misinformation, such as political disinformation (Jerit & Zhao, 2020), health misinformation (Suarez-Lledo & Alvarez-Galvez, 2021), information confrontations (Eggen, 2024), the disinformation order (Bennett & Livingston, 2018), or the spread of fake news (Allcot & Gentzkow, 2017). In general, we can sort research on dis- and misinformation according to four main strands (Humprecht et al., 2020: Kalsnes, 2019; Salaverría & Cardoso, 2023): definition, diffusion, consumption, and detection. Regarding definition, a large share of the recent research literature has focused on the conceptual aspect, or what constitutes disinformation, misinformation, and fake news – that is, what it is (e.g., Farkas & Schou, 2018; McNair, 2017; Tandoc et al., 2018). Another strand concentrates on diffusion, often with a more technological focus – how dis- and misinformation spreads (e.g., Hajli et al., 2022; Ng & Taeihagh, 2021). Third, research has explored the psychological mechanisms behind why people consume and fall for false information (e.g., Pennycook & Rand, 2021), including why individuals may believe even implausible disinformation despite knowing better (Fazio & Marsh, 2008). Finally, a fourth large research strand deals with what tactics, tools, and competences exist for detecting and countering dis- and misinformation (e.g., Pamment, 2022; Tulin et al., 2024; Walter et al., 2019). Research on dis- and misinformation has been conducted within a broad range of disciplines, for example, media studies (Kalsnes, 2019; Samuelsen, 2023), defence studies (Karlsen, 2019, 2021), and political science (Borch, 2023; Gjesvik & Øvrebø, 2019; Schia & Gjesvik, 2020), to mention a few. As the research falls within the purview of various academic disciplines (European Digital Media Observatory, 2024), it can be difficult to gain a coherent understanding of the field of study.

Nevertheless, several insightful systematic review studies on dis- and misinformation and related terms have been conducted (e.g., Arqoub et al., 2022; Broda & Strömbäck, 2024; Ha et al., 2021; Madrid-Morales & Wasserman, 2022), but none with the specific geographical focus we propose here. We argue that a narrow geographic focus can be valuable, as the extent of and resilience to dis- and misinformation varies with social and political context. Interestingly, the Nordic countries are perceived as particularly resilient to dis- and misinformation (Humprecht et al., 2020); however, the recent geopolitical aggression from Russia and the use of disinformation towards the Nordic countries pose new challenges for the presumably resilient region. The Nordic region has experienced notable instances of information operations and disinformation (Ahonen et al., 2024), including campaigns during the 2023 Finnish parliamentary elections (Moilanen et al., 2023); the foreign influence campaign targeting Sweden’s NATO membership process, disclosed by the Swedish Prime Minister in January 2023 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023); an information influence campaign that falsely alleged that Swedish social services systematically abducted Muslim children, leading to significant social unrest and international diplomatic tensions (Ranstorp & Ahlerup, 2023); and broader patterns identified in recent research on Russian influence operations across the Nordic–Baltic region (Ahonen et al., 2024). Thus, we narrowed our focus to the Nordic countries, a geographical region in Northern Europe characterised by five welfare states with multiparty political systems and robust media systems marked by long traditions of press freedom, strong public service media, high media trust, and generous subsidies (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Jakobsson et al., 2024; Skogerbø et al., 2021). The Nordic sociopolitical context is characterised by high institutional trust (Dahlen & Skirbekk, 2021), robust freedom of speech protections (Giandomenico & Linderstål, 2023; Government Offices of Sweden, 2020; Moilanen et al., 2023), high quality of the education systems (Moilanen et al., 2023), and an advanced digital infrastructure (Syvertsen et al., 2014). The closeness to Russia – particularly for immediate neighbouring countries Finland, Norway, and Sweden – and the recent NATO memberships of Finland and Sweden have pushed the importance of resilience against dis- and misinformation high up on the public agenda (Samuelsen, 2023). Consequently, several initiatives to safeguard democracy have been implemented within the Nordic countries. For example, Sweden established the Psychological Defence Agency in 2022 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2020), and the Norwegian government is developing a strategy to increase the population’s resilience against disinformation (Norwegian Government, 2024).

None of the existing literature reviews on dis- and misinformation are explicit integrative reviews. While previous review studies have mainly focused on media and communication studies (Arqoub et al., 2022) or found most research on the topic in communication and psychology journals (Ha et al., 2021), we argue that it is important to have a broad perspective on the research field in order to understand how dis- and misinformation and related phenomena are understood, challenged, and counteracted. Thus, the integrative review presented here allows us to examine a broad range of fields and detect research gaps. Based on insights from previous studies, we address the following research questions:

RQ1. Which terminology is used to conduct research on dis- and misinformation related to the Nordic countries?

Next, we explain how we have conducted our study, applying an integrative review.

To address our research questions and identify research gaps in dis- and misinformation research in the Nordic countries, we conducted an integrative review of relevant Nordic studies. An integrative review offers valuable insights into the current state of the topic and allows the recommendation of future research directions (Cronin & George, 2020). The purpose of the integrative literature review is to generate new knowledge about a topic “by reviewing, critiquing, and synthesizing representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated” (Torraco, 2005: 362). This approach also enables the inclusion of both experimental and non-experimental studies, providing a more comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon (Souza et al., 2010), as well as across different disciplines or “communities of practice” (Cronin & George, 2020). Additionally, an integrative review allows for the synthesis of data from both theoretical and empirical literature (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005), enhancing the depth of analysis.

The advantage of employing an integrative review is how it functions as a tool for knowledge integration on a topic via multiple communities’ perspectives. Here, we have followed a step-by-step process according to the checklist for writing an integrative literature review (Torraco, 2005), ranging from narrowing down the topic, applying relevant search words for relevant databases, including and excluding literature, and conducting thematic synthesis. Thus, we undertook a systematic sampling of the literature involving searching, screening, and selecting. This involved an initial broad search approach across different databases using predetermined search words, which was followed by a screening against the inclusion criteria.

The literature search was conducted across various databases, tailored to each country – NORA (Denmark), Finna and Doria (Finland), Leitir (Iceland), Idunn (Norway), SwePub (Sweden) – Scopus, as well as Google Scholar in each country. Each country’s researchers contributing to this article conducted searches tailored to their respective nation. An extensive list of search terms was chosen to ensure a comprehensive overview of the dis- and misinformation field: disinformation, misinformation, fake news, propaganda, digital propaganda, information influence, infodemic, information warfare, cognitive warfare, hybrid warfare, information disorder, and information operations. Searches were conducted in the respective Nordic languages as well as English, consistently pairing the country’s name with each search term (e.g., disinformation AND Norway). However, in Denmark and Sweden, the NORA database and the SwePub database exclusively include research by scholars affiliated with institutions in their respective countries. As a result, it was unnecessary to include country names in the search terms, and they were therefore omitted.

Along with the search terms, our selection criteria were as follows: 1) the search terms had to appear in the title, abstract, or keywords; 2) the first author needed to be affiliated with an institution in the country of focus, or the publication itself needed to focus on that specific country; 3) the publication date had to fall between January 2014 and April 2024; 4) the publication’s perspective had to be “current”, rather than historical or retrospective; 5) the publication had to be a peer-reviewed article or conference proceeding, book, book chapter, report (scientific, governmental, or commercial), or doctoral thesis; and 6) the publication had to be available online. 2014 was strategically chosen as the starting point due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which marked a significant shift in the security landscape and led to an increase in influence operations in many countries, including the Nordic region (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2017).

If a publication met the inclusion criteria, it was added to a spreadsheet with separate sheets for each country. If a publication was later found not to meet the criteria during the coding process, it was removed. Additionally, each country’s researchers verified that the first author had an affiliation with that country, the study focused on that country, or both. All sheets were merged into a single Nordic dataset for the synthesis, with duplicates removed simultaneously. Table 1 shows the number of publications that met the inclusion criteria and the number of included publications for each country after omitting duplicates.

Following the guidelines for conducting an integrative review (Cronin & George, 2020: 181; Torraco, 2005), our coding was conducted inductively, guided by several analytical dimensions derived from the research questions. In light of the diversity of the identified body of literature, we chose this open coding approach rather than predefined categories to avoid bias towards the state-of-the-art in specific academic disciplines or countries. For each publication, each country team noted the topic, methods used, and the geographical scope of the analysis, as close as possible to what was stated in the actual publication. For academic discipline (e.g., health, computer science), the country teams registered the discipline for the publication outlet, where applicable, else the discipline of the institution to which the first author was affiliated, again where applicable.

We also registered the title, outlet, and year of publication, as well as the name and affiliation of all authors. For each dimension, the results of the open coding were then collaboratively and iteratively discussed by three authors to group the publications into specific, mutually exclusive categories that would allow for a quantitative description of the findings. A detailed overview of the categories and coding rules can be found in the Appendix.

Our coding strategy thus combined a qualitative interpretation of the main tendencies and thematic patterns with a quantitative description and visualisation of the data to extract insights into overall trends. Throughout the coding process, we held regular meetings to discuss findings, refine the coding strategy, and align interpretations across the different countries. This collaborative approach aimed to enhance the reliability of the coding.

Regarding the terminology used as keywords in research on dis- and misinformation (RQ1), it varied across academic fields and, to some extent, across the Nordic countries. While certain terms appeared across multiple disciplines, others were more specialised. For instance, in Denmark and Iceland, the terms “fake news” and “misinformation” were more commonly used than “disinformation” (we use expressions such as “in Denmark” to refer to publications identified in the given country, where either the first author holds an affiliation with a university or institution in that country, or if the focus of the publication is on that country). In military and security studies, research frequently used terms like “information operations”, and “hybrid warfare”, “information influence”, “malign information influence”, and “information warfare”, where disinformation was often considered part of broader influence operations combining multiple techniques. Notably, the term “propaganda” was rarely used in the included publications, as it was mostly associated with historical contexts. Consequently, publications employing the term in a historical context were excluded based on the selection criteria. Media, journalism, and communication studies predominantly used “fake news”, “disinformation”, and “misinformation”, focusing on their impact on media trust, democratic discourse, and public perception. Health studies incorporated “misinformation” but also employed other terms such as “infodemic” to describe the rapid spread of misleading health-related information.

Addressing RQ2, we find that the range of primary disciplines (see Figure 1), publication outlets (see Figure 2), and affiliations (see Figure 3) tended to vary across the countries. Two disciplines were most prominent in each country: journalism, media, and communication; and security (which also encompasses national security and military science; see Figure 1). However, Iceland was an exception, as no security studies were identified, likely influenced by the fact that Iceland does not have a military service.

Computer science (including cybersecurity), as well as political science and international relations, emerged as the third-largest fields in terms of publication volume, both contributing an equal number of publications. Research in these fields was found across all Nordic countries, with Denmark accounting for the highest number. Public health research also formed another significant category, again with Denmark leading in publication volume. Additionally, Denmark had publications in philosophy while Finland and Sweden had a modest presence in education studies. Other smaller fields represented in the data include management, law, psychology, and library and information science.

Figure 1

Disciplines across the countries in the included publications by country, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

The range of publication outlets also varied across the countries, spanning reports, books, doctoral theses, conference proceedings, and journal articles (see Figure 2). Journal articles and conference proceedings were the most common publication type in each country. Books or book chapters were the second most frequent output format and were more common in Finland and Sweden than in Denmark and Norway. In Iceland, however, the majority of publications were reports, though Sweden had the highest number of reports overall. Norway and Sweden had a significant number of government-funded publications, and many of these were in the form of reports offering clear advice and recommendations, highlighting a close connection between research and policy. Doctoral theses were published only in Denmark and Finland.

Figure 2

Types of included publications by country, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

The most common affiliation of the first author in each country was a university (see Figure 3). Another significant affiliation was the military, including defence universities and defence research institutes; however, this was not the case in Iceland, for reasons already explained above. Other research institutes – such as the Finnish Institute of Health and Welfare and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) – along with ministries and government bodies, contributed to publications in all countries.

Figure 3

Author affiliations in the included publications by country, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

Turning to the methods used (RQ3), we found that qualitative research methods were the most common (see Figure 4), incorporating techniques such as interviews, discourse analysis, content analysis, and narrative analysis. Quantitative and conceptual approaches were used at similar levels. Frequently used quantitative approaches included surveys and experiments, for example, to gauge the prevalence and effect of dis- and misinformation perceptions in the general public, and computational methods to analyse the dissemination of dis- and misinformation on social media, as well as to develop tools for automated fake news detection. Conceptual approaches ranged from philosophical treatises on the meaning of “fake news” to security-oriented policy papers. In Denmark, qualitative and quantitative methods were more evenly distributed than in other countries. Additionally, Denmark and Finland had a significant number of conceptual papers that did not include empirical data.

Figure 4

Methods used in the included publications by country, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

In terms of the main topics in Nordic research on dis- and misinformation (RQ4), five main topics emerged from the articles: security and Russia’s actions; media and fact-checking; health; media literacy; and social media. Next, we present each topic.

Social media

Finally, the fifth major topic identified across the publications in the Nordic countries was social media, with a particular focus on how dis- and misinformation spread on various platforms (e.g., Alaraatikka et al., 2022; Bengtsson et al., 2021; Bergh, 2020b; Colliander, 2019) and how it could be contained (e.g., Taher & Alhajj, 2023; Westermann & Coscia, 2022). This topic was also studied across a wide range of disciplines, including communication, computer science, military and security studies, political science, health, and education. Many publications identified social media as a significant source of disinformation (e.g., Geirdal, 2023; Kalsnes, 2019; Sivertsen et al., 2021; Spansvoll, 2023; Steensen, 2023) with some studies, especially in Iceland, examining news consumption during specific events and highlighting the role of social media in the spread of dis- and misinformation in contexts such as during parliamentary election campaigns (Magnússon et al., 2021) and during the Covid-19 pandemic (Hafstein et al., 2020). While one Swedish study explored the spread of disinformation via videogames and related platforms (Pamment et al., 2023), and one Finnish study examined the use of the dark web as a Covid-19 information source (Sirola et al., 2022), the majority of research in or by researchers from the Nordic countries concentrated on social media platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) (e.g., Hedman et al., 2018; Kjær et al., 2022; Schroeder, 2020; Shahi et al., 2021) and Facebook (e.g., Granskogen & Gulla, 2017; Madvig et al., 2022; Nounkeu Tatchou, 2020). In Denmark and Finland, quantitative and computational approaches were particularly employed in studies focusing on social media, specifically analysing the circulation of dis- and misinformation (e.g., Santos Rasmussen et al., 2020; Vinther-Jensen, 2020; Charquero-Ballester et al., 2021; Coscia & Rossi, 2020; Henriksen et al., 2024; Unlu et al., 2023, 2024a, b, c). Within political science and security, studies examined the exploitation of social media for influence operations by both state actors (e.g., Bergh, 2019; 2020a) and non-state actors, including extremist political groups (e.g., Bergh, 2023; Ranstorp & Ahlerup, 2023), and focused on, for instance, the role of social media in populism (Horsti & Saresma, 2021; Malinen et al., 2022). Apart from case studies on specific platforms or campaigns (e.g., Hedman et al., 2018; Ranstorp & Ahlerup, 2023; Strand et al., 2021), some studies took a broader approach by, for example, examining the market for buying social media engagements and its implications for disinformation (Lindquist & Weltervrede, 2024). Researchers also explored the darker aspects of social media and its implications for national security (Norri-Sederholm et al., 2019, 2020b). In media and health, the focus was on Covid-19, with many studies exploring dis- and misinformation regarding the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g., Hafstein et al., 2020; Shahi et al., 2021; Unlu et al., 2023, 2024a, b, c).

Lastly, we turn to the fifth research question, the evolution of research from 2014 to 2024 (RQ5). Across the Nordic countries, research on dis- and misinformation increased significantly over the years. In 2014, publications originated only from Denmark and Finland, but from 2018 onward, contributions emerged from all five countries (see Figure 5). The number of studies rose sharply in 2020 and peaked in 2023. Here, it is important to note that the data for 2024 only covers the spring and does not represent the entire year, which explains why the numbers appear lower compared to previous years.

Figure 5

Number of publications included per year by country, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

Comments: Data collection ended in April 2024.

Addressing the changes in terms of which research methods were employed over the years, there was a general upward trend across all approaches, with a particularly notable increase in quantitative methods around 2019 (see Figure 6). Early publications were primarily conceptual, but by 2018, all method approaches were represented. As the number of publications grew, the use of different methods increased as well.

Figure 6

Methods used in included publications, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

Comments: Data collection ended in April 2024.

While each country followed its own trajectory, there were some clear patterns observed for academic disciplines (see Figure 7): Early studies were primarily rooted in security studies, but after 2016 – that is, following the US presidential election and the Brexit referendum – studies in journalism, media, and communication, as well as political science and international relations, became more frequent. The notable surge in publications after 2019 was largely driven by global events, particularly the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This period also marked a diversification of academic disciplines engaging with dis- and misinformation research, including fields like psychology, philosophy, computer science, and health sciences. Since 2020, research on dis- and misinformation on social media has increased significantly, reflecting both the growing influence of digital platforms and the interdisciplinary nature of recent studies.

Figure 7

Disciplines in the included publications, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

Comments: Data collection ended in April 2024.

As Figure 8 shows, the majority of research contributions across countries had a national focus, analysing dis- and misinformation within the respective country, though occasionally including comparisons with other Nordic or European countries. Studies with a global focus were often concerned with dis- and misinformation on social media platforms, outside of any specific national context. While Russian-backed disinformation was a frequent topic of analysis – particularly in nationally focused studies and those focusing on the “West” as a geographical entity – only a few studies, primarily from Finland, addressed cases of dis- and misinformation in Russia or Ukraine. A small number of studies focused on disinformation related to US elections or on instances of dis- and misinformation in other countries, without any direct connection to the Nordic region. Notably, a substantial number of studies did not have a geographical focus at all, per se; these included, for example, conceptual studies on the nature of fake news or methodological approaches on developing dis- and misinformation detection algorithms.

Figure 8

Geographical scopes in the included publications, 2014–2024 (N = 359)

Comments: Data collection ended in April 2024.