Between Spanish Language and Multilingualism in Spain: The Radical Right Placement

As we have indicated in the previous section, a feature that distinguishes Vox from the extreme right is its acceptance of the democratic system and, consequently, of the set of norms that constitute the rule of law. We could qualify the party’s discourse as constitutionalist insofar as it cites the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (SC) as the key legislative framework that supports its argument. This is extracted from numerous analyzed tweets:

The SC is the backbone of a series of basic principles unrelated to an ideological use, so any violation implies an attack on the “nation,” “Spain,” or “the Spaniards,” which are the true political subjects in Vox’s paradigm. If this respect for the SC seems to be a cornerstone of Vox’s ideology, it is logical to infer its total commitment to all the responsibilities contained in its articles. With regard to the languages of Spain, we detect explicit manifestations that value the multilingual reality and respect diversity:

The cited article of the statutes is largely aligned with Article 3 of the SC, which draws many comments, while the second fragment recognizes diversity and plurality as elements it is necessary to safeguard, although it points to the autonomous territorial system as an imbalance of this wealth. We underline here a first element that acts as a distortion of a previous state unrelated to subjectivities or self-determinations: the AACC system symbolizes a centrifugal force that favors the dissolution of a shared common essence represented by the Spanish nation, the pivotal political subject in Vox’s discourse that is contradictorily configured as a centripetal force. This hypothesis, based on the territorial model and its implications regarding unity in diversity or diversity in unity, is specified below in its linguistic aspect:

Again, these references appeal to the constitutional order that includes the obligation to know Spanish and transfers competence in linguistic matters of the other Spanish languages to their respective AACC in accordance with their statutes (SC 1978, art. 3). As we said above in the form of a metaphor between centrifugal forces and a centripetal force, the previous fragments confirm this assertion: in (5) an “unpolitical” subject is opposed and prior to any form of subsequent articulation, the Spaniards, before the AACC, specifically that of Catalonia, whose executive institution is branded as “traitorous.” The constitutionalist tone reflected in the organic documentation acquires at this point a bellicose semantic nuance between order and law carried out by the Supreme Court in confrontation with a segment of that essential whole. The three previous politicians also add the opposition between the common language, Spanish, and regional languages: the first as an exclusive reference of shared Spanish culture and the second reduced to traditional artifacts and juxtaposed to elements of customs or folklore.

This hierarchical ordering is presented as logical and neutral since Article 3 of the SC incites an interpretation in which three stages of languages follow one another with less protection as we move away from the first epigraph: 1) Spanish is the only official language of the State, 2) the other languages will be official in the terms dictated by the statutes of autonomy and 3) a diffuse “richness of the different linguistic modalities of Spain” is presented (SC 1978, art. 3.3). This interpretation arouses the greatest consensus in sociolinguistics in Spain and it is precisely the one that Vox embraces to legitimize an exclusive framework that guarantees Spanish a series of privileges while relegating the other Spanish languages to the corner of folklore, the particular, the local, and, ultimately, as the linguistic vertex of a centrifugal force. This paradigm of interpretation of Article 3 of the SC is that of the hierarchy of languages. Vox feels comfortable with this analysis because it highlights a common language which, since it is the only one shared in the entire Spanish territory, holds a favored position in the legal system which is logical, while the other Spanish languages are in a smaller territorial environment and, therefore, of less social scope and protection.

With the aim of reversing this argument maintained by Vox, we propose a paradigm that interprets Article 3 in an alternative way. We consider that, as a basic legal norm that articulates State regulation, the SC includes a minimum framework to which the rest of the legislative codes must adhere but does not go into details about what said codes must complete. First, Article 3.1 is based on an objective fact: the language with the largest number of speakers and with the greatest geographical extension in Spain is Spanish; therefore, it is expected that it will be official in the State. However, this epigraph does not exclude the possibility of a more beneficial state representation than the current one for the other languages of Spain.

Second, the principle of territoriality is not as broad for the other Spanish languages: they are spoken in specific AACCs. At this point, Article 3.2 of the SC opens the door for them, through their respective statutes, to legislate on linguistic matters and endow their languages with the degree of social insertion that the citizens of these territories consider freely. Following this paradigm, if there are unofficial languages —such as Asturian or Aragonese — or if others have not received the condition of compulsory knowledge — such as Basque in the Basque Country (Organic Law 3/1979, art. 6.1)— the responsibility falls on the side of the autonomy statutes and, by extension, on the populations of these territories.

Third, we understand that Article 3.3. of the SC, far from implying a disregard for nonofficial languages, serves as a synthesis to reinforce respect and protection for all Spanish languages and, once again, opens the door for nonofficial languages to still enjoy a minimum guarantee of protection and promotion. According to Vernet i Llobet (2007), this epigraph makes it possible, in the absence of autonomous regulation of certain languages, for the State to intercede in their regulation. In short, the alternative paradigm proposed here aims to analyze Article 3 of the SC in a way favorable to multilingualism in Spain. Assuming this model, Vox’s discourse would be headless, since this interpretation favors a debate in which, even from the SC, the protection of the plurality of languages in Spain is supported.

As we have advanced, the territorial model is a central point in Vox’s ideology to legitimize nationalism and the measures emanating from this precept. The Agenda Spain begins with an allegation against the autonomous system, labeled as “taifa kingdoms” and multilevel Spain, and describes it as a territorial organization:

Autonomous institutions are perceived as entities that unbalance equal rights. On the linguistic level, since the AACC legislate on their languages, Vox proposes the “suppression of different institutions associated with language policy” (Carnicero 2021). This party proposes the liquidation of the autonomous language policy as a preventive measure against the deepening decentralization that this legislation implies. Certain resources in charge of language promotion, such as regional public television, are under attack by Vox:

The autonomous public television represents an agent destabilizing the unity of Spain since one of its objectives is the visibility and promotion of languages other than Spanish. According to these postulates, delving into linguistic matters is a “true linguistic outrage” (S. Abascal, apud. Cadena SER 2020) and a concession to the independence movement (Casqueiro and Hermida 2021). This ideology coincides with the maxim of “one state, one nation, one language” (Ramallo 2009, 136). This thesis is contradicted, then, by the SC to which Vox alludes and which guarantees the protection of the country’s linguistic wealth. However, this party insists on a plural project comprised of national unity— “the future passes through a united Spain, proud of its variety and plurality” (point 2, Agenda Spain)—although its leaders express intolerance towards this plurality:

In recent times, the debate on the hypothetical officialization of Asturian in Asturias has shown that the Spanish radical right equates the linguistic project with the separatist project and, therefore, the revitalization of a language would generate new sovereign demands to configure a nationalist movement. This reasoning is fallacious since the officialization of a language does not derive from the strengthening of a nationalist movement, which does not inevitably generate a goal of political-administrative independence of a territory. Thus, instead of generating an additive framework of coexistence, Asturian, like other languages, would suppose an exclusive scenario contrary to national unity. In this paradigm, multilevel Spain has Spanish languages other than Spanish as a first step of division, then these languages are enemies for Vox’s unity project. The respect for plurality expressed above is low-intensity respect since Vox only tolerates multilingualism as long as Spanish is the hegemonic language and the other ones are not promoted.

This is so much so that it does not seem that the ignorance of non-Spanish languages poses any kind of problem for this party:

In June 2021, Vox proposed to modify the Basic Statute of Public Employees with the objective that co-official languages other than Spanish are given merit that is “valued and proportionally weighted according to the specific position” (Vox Parliamentary Group 2021), but never a requirement to access the autonomous public function. Currently, “Public Administrations […] must plan the selection of duly trained public employees to fill jobs in the AACC with two official languages” (Royal Legislative Decree 5/2015, art. 56.2). This dichotomy is based on the principle of equality to access public employment.

On one hand, the SC establishes that access to public service must be carried out under conditions of equality (SC 1978, art. 23.2). Thus, the requirement to know the non-Spanish official language in the AACC to apply for public employment violates this provision and can be understood as a discriminatory preference (Sánchez Morón 2020). In addition, and in contradiction to the previous quote of the Basic Statute of Public Employees, it is aligned with the SC by stating that “all citizens have the right to access public employment in accordance with the constitutional principles of equality, merit and ability [...]” (Royal Legislative Decree 5/2015, art. 55). On the other hand, the AACC with more than one official language must select civil servants who can satisfy the active right of citizens to interact with public administrations in the official language of their choice, as well as the passive right to receive the answer in that language (Agirreazkuenaga Zigorraga 2005).

The extensive jurisprudence in this regard has not clarified the acceptability of this linguistic requirement, but we must emphasize that the Constitutional Court (CC) has produced conclusions that combine both interests. Specifically, in response to an appeal of unconstitutionality regarding the right to use Basque in the public administration of the Basque Country, the CC accepted the knowledge of this language as a merit for the provision of public places since the guarantee of offering the service to citizenship in Basque corresponds to the administration as a whole and not to individual officials (Sentence 76/1983). This coordination in terms of linguistic rights has been classified as “objective bilingualism of the service,” (Ramos Moragues 2010; Erkoreka Gervasio 1996, 24) and we consider that it progresses access to public employment under equal conditions and the guarantee of citizens to interact with the administration of their territory in the official language of their choice.

Based on this analysis, Vox does not show intention to reach a solution that resolves this confrontation without violating the principle of equality. In fact, this party claims this principle in a biased way to satisfy its ideology of the hegemony of Spanish. So far, we observe the ideological and political line that Vox raises in the debate on the languages of Spain within a conflictual paradigm between national unity and multilevel Spain. The assessment of the plurality contained in its organic documents and even in public demonstrations by its members is called into question when the party proposes to laminate language policy, close regional television channels, and reduce minoritized Spanish languages to the realm of the merely folkloric and anecdotal.

In the first point of the Agenda Spain, Vox affirms that “a Spain without distinctions or internal borders is the best guarantee of prosperity and well-being for all.” Based on this ruling, the principles of equality and progress are based on a multidimensional homogenization: a unified territory, a shared culture, and a common language. Some tweets are consistent with these assumptions:

Two important principles are extracted from these statements. On one hand, they establish a model of alterity opposed to a Spanish-speaking endogroup. These deputies build a militant “us” with Spanish since this language seems to be the only one capable of representing a series of national values. On the other hand, the other languages of Spain are displaced from the capacity to participate in a national subject that Vox insists is common throughout the territory. Thus, the exclusion of these speakers responds to a biased ideal of a nation that does not integrate the multilingual reality of Spain and that contradicts the party’s statutory assumptions. On the other hand, the aforementioned statements share the concern to protect Spanish. This defense makes sense when there is a latent danger that threatens the sociolinguistic vitality of this language. This work is not quantitative, but we do not resist offering a revealing fact: 53% of the analyzed tweets contain allusions to the attacks that Spanish is undergoing by the “linguistic imposition” in the bilingual AACC. Let us see some statements about it:

These examples draw a warlike scenario in which one of the parties, that of the Spanish language, is the victim of attacks made by the other contender, the “linguistic imposition,” meaning the other Spanish languages. In this discourse, the classic dichotomy between dominance and hegemony emerges. While dominance is based on coercive control, hegemony requires that social control is not perceived (Rull 2010). Through what we can call “invisible discursive practices” (Blackledge 2000), the hegemonic power achieves a social reaction without society itself being aware that its activity is being oriented in a certain way. Vox presents linguistic normalization as a set of coercive impositions that violate individual freedom of expression in Spanish. Meanwhile, the predominant presence of Spanish in economic, political, or cultural spheres falls within the realm of the hegemonic because it is based on a priori neutral factors such as the SC, the sovereignty of the Spaniards, or the so-called education in freedom:

These tweets are complemented by those that appeal to freedom of decision on the part of the students’ families to be schooled in the language of their choice within the official languages in a given territory. The result of both premises leads to the thesis that freedom is manifested whenever there is individual freedom of decision. In the specific context of Catalonia, linguistic immersion in Catalan in public schools has reduced the presence of Spanish in the subject of Spanish Language and Literature. This model has the endorsement of the CC as long as the learning of Spanish is guaranteed. Despite the fact that social life is carried out mainly in Spanish, with the exception of autonomous institutions, it is questionable to what extent the linguistic skills essential for the integration of the individual in a community can be acquired from educational and formal registers if an official language does not acquire the status of the language of instruction. It is precisely active bilingualism that guarantees freedom. If the population of an officially bilingual territory is competent in the linguistic skills of those languages, we can speak of freedom as long as the two linguistic options are mastered and it is possible to freely choose.

A second phrase used by Vox to delve into this thesis consists of the internationality of Spanish, a factor that opens the economic and commercial doors to a much more extensive market:

Here, the symbolic power of Spanish overflows mainly in Hispanic America, thus inserting the international component. This new category further reduces the legitimate field of action for the other Spanish languages, which, because they are spoken in territories hierarchically subordinate to a State, are presented as “regional languages” (J. Buxadé on Twitter, July 14, 2020 and June 11, 2020). The Spanish language emerges “as a symbol of concord, democracy, economic progress, as an instrument at the service of a post-nation, of a panhispanic international community that leaves Catalan, Galician, and Basque reduced to reactionary atavism and particularism” (Del Valle 2007, 53). Spanish would mobilize a series of economic resources whose amplitude would be proportional to the degree of protection and expansion.

The globalized economy maintains a link with the linguistic reality of which Vox is aware. In the report on The International Forum of Globalization, Cavanagh and Mander (2002, 19) listed eight characteristics of liberalism, among which is “global cultural (and, we would add, linguistic) and economic homogenization.” In the commercial activities of modern companies and states, language is an integral part of economic exchanges (Marazzi 2002). When Vox proposes a greater approach to the Spanish-speaking world based on a shared language, it is conceived as an intercessory tool in the exchange of capital. Consequently, the hegemonic dimension that revalues languages passes through the filter of the ability to transfer capital.