Comparing the resilience objectives of Finnish comprehensive security model and the NATO baseline requirements for resilience
Lauri Jauhiainen
Profilo Orcid e Sarah Schiffling
Profilo Orcid 
Categoria dell'articolo: Original Study
Pubblicato online: 26 apr 2025
Ricevuto: 19 ott 2024
Accettato: 21 gen 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jms-2025-0003
Parole chiave
© 2025 Lauri Jauhiainen et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
The main aspects of the NBRs in the CSM
| Continuity of Government | Authorities as main actors
Compiling and analysing information Alleviating fear and anxiety within the society Building trust in authorities Authorities should not enhance learned helplessness in society |
NGOs and companies in auxiliary role and messengers
Joint preparedness planning NGOs as two-way messengers Training and reliable communication |
Individuals as ‘active survivors’ Back-up communication system such as battery radio Strengthening ‘community spirit’ |
| Resilient Energy Supplies | Authorities in supplementary role
Share majority to ensure power to decide (National grid and natural gas transmission networks) National stock (fuels, coal, oil products, and natural gas) |
Private sector in leading role
Maintaining communication network Underground cabling and building additional circular connections Leasing of LNG terminal Preparedness stock for district heating companies, energy importer companies, and energy suppliers |
Individuals as ‘active survivors’ How to cope with power outage How to save energy |
| Resilient Civil Communications Services |
Authorities as service users Information services (for situational awareness and decision-making capacity) |
Private sector as service providers
Ensuring critical services (government information services, payment transfer systems, and health care systems) Reliability of transport and communication infrastructure (data communication links and cyber-security measures)+ |
Individuals as ‘active actors’ How should electronic devices be protected Battery radios as means for complementary communications |
| Resilient Food and Water Supplies | Authorities as observers and stock keepers
Monitoring (food and water safety and production situation) Keeping safety stock (grains for 6 months) |
Private sector as producers
Ensuring supply (functioning of supply chain) Preparedness action (physical security and cyber-security) |
Individuals as ‘active survivors’ Home emergency food supply 72 h concept |
| Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems | Authorities as legislators and stock keepers
Keeping safety stock (fuels for 5 months) |
Private sector as service providers
Services (military logistics partnerships and civilian logistics) Preparedness (planning and joint exercises) |
Individuals in a minor or non-existent role
Voluntary: keep car tank at least half full |
| Ability to Deal with Large-Scale Population Movements | Authorities as planners and service users
Evacuation of Finnish residents (preparedness planning) Large-scale population movements over border (preparedness planning) |
Private sector as service providers
Operating immigrant reception centres Services for immigrants |
Individuals in a minor or non-existent role
Volunteer service coordinated by NGOs |
| Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties | Authorities as service providers and stock keepers
Emergency preparedness (emergency services) Safety stocks (medical material also in cooperation with the Finnish Defence Forces) |
Private sector as service providers and stock keepers
Services (voluntary rescue services) Safety stocks (Pharmaceuticals) |
Individuals as ‘active survivors’ and active participants in the NGOs How to shelter indoors First aid supplies First aid skills |
The vital functions in the security strategy for society (Government of Finland 2017)
| (1) Leadership | Leadership ‘provides the basis for safeguarding all other functions’. It includes the requirements of effective leadership, for example: ‘clear lines of authority’, ‘a situation picture’, ‘crisis communications’, ‘continuity management’, and ‘cooperation’. (p. 15). |
| (2) International and EU activities | The vital function ‘[p]roviding a basis for international cooperation and participation in crisis prevention’ is deemed important in ‘safeguarding of other vital functions’ and includes fighting global threats such as ‘uncontrolled migration, pandemics, terrorism and international crime’. (p. 17). |
| (3) Defence capability | The main objective is to ‘establish deterrence against the use of military force against Finland’ and the preparedness needed for this is developed ‘as part of the concept for comprehensive security in a joint effort by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens’. (p. 18). |
| (4) Internal security | The vital function aims to ‘prevent and counter criminal activities […] prevent accidents, environmental damage and other similar incidents and threats. It also allows Finland to successfully manage the consequences of the above activities, threats and incidents’. (p. 19). |
| (5) Economy, infrastructure, and security of supply | The vital function safeguards ‘the funding and other resources for vital functions’. The objects to be safeguarded include Finnish and ‘international infrastructure’, organizations, constructs and ‘processes’ that are ‘essential for vital functions’. (p. 20). |
| (6) Functional capacity of the population and services | The vital function aims to maintain ‘key basic services’ to help ‘ensure independent living in all situations’. This includes ‘social welfare’ and medical services. (p. 22). |
| (7) Psychological resilience | The vital function means ‘the ability of individuals, communities, society and the nation to withstand the pressures arising from crisis situations and to recover from their impacts’. This includes ‘will to defend country’s independence’ and is strengthened among other things by high ‘trust in the authorities’ and preventing social divisions among citizens. (p. 22–23). |
j_jms-2025-0003_tab_004
| Continuity of Government | ‘An assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance, the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis’ (p. 8) ‘Strengthen the democratic resilience of our societies’ (p. 17) | ‘Continuity of Government: maintaining at all times the ability to make decisions, communicate them, and enforce them, and to provide essential government services to the population.’ (p. 92) |
| Resilient Energy Supplies | ‘Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient energy supplies: ensuring that energy supply, including national power grids, are secure and that nations maintain the necessary prioritization arrangements and redundancy.’ (p. 92) |
| Resilient Civil Communications Services | ‘Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions’ (p. 8) ‘reliable 5G network and efficient options to restore it if need be’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient Civil Communications Services: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks remain functional even in demanding conditions and under attacks.’ (p. 93) |
| Resilient Food and Water Supply | ‘Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient Food and Water Supply: ensuring sufficient supplies are available to both civilians and the military, and safe from disruption of sabotage.’ (p. 93) |
| Ability to Deal with Large-Scale Population Movements | ‘The ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people.’ (p. 8) | ‘Ability to Deal with Large Scale Population Movements and to be able to de-conflict such movements from potential national or Alliance military deployments and other requirements.’ (p. 93) |
| Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties | ‘The ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure’ (p. 8) | ‘Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties: ensuring that health systems can cope even in very demanding situations when there might be simultaneous pressure on civilian and military health care capabilities.’ (p. 93) |
| Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems | ‘The functioning of transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian transportation networks remain functional and effective to support civil and military requirements even when challenged or attacked.’ (p. 93) |
Coverage of Finnish Government level (G) and lower-level (L) documents of the NBRs
| Continuity of Government | G | G | L |
| Resilient Energy Supplies | G | G | L |
| Resilient Civil Communications Services | G | G | (G), L |
| Resilient Food and Water Supply | G | G | G, L |
| Ability to Deal with Large-Scale Population Movements | G | G | |
| Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties | G | G | L |
| Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems | G | G |