The Things That Are Me. The Phenomenological Epochè Turned Upside- down

This article challenges the foundational assumption of Western thought that posits a separation between the subject and the external world—a dichotomy underpinning much of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. This dualistic premise, which denies that the observer can be the observed, renders ordinary phenomena, such as perceiving a chocolate muffin, metaphysically problematic. Traditional phenomenology, exemplified by Husserl and its contemporary heirs like Zahavi and Hutto, attempts to address this issue by reifying experience as a primary domain distinct from the natural world. However, these approaches inadvertently introduce ontological complexity by perpetuating the bifurcation of nature into “phenomenal” and “real” domains.

The Mind-Object Identity (MOI) theory offers an alternative that dissolves this dualism. It posits that perception is not a relation between a subject and an object but the relative existence of the object itself within a physical framework. The MOI flips Husserl’s epoché, bracketing not the natural world but the subject and its presumed phenomenological interiority. By replacing the dualistic notion of “experience” with the concept of relative existence, the MOI provides a parsimonious ontology, reconciling naturalism with a relational understanding of reality. This paradigm invites a reevaluation of the human presence in the world—not as observers of it, but as integral parts of its relational existence.