<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>Some determinist approaches to free will opine that the human brain is subordinate to physical laws not fully under our control. This results in a weakening of the concept of the personal autonomy and moral responsibility of humans. Were we to acknowledge this assumption, we might consider automatic machines unable to influence the thoughts and intentions from which our actions take root. The key issue lies in the fact that an individual does not consciously engage in particular actions (automatisms), which challenges the concept of free will in an individual’s complex behaviour. Despite this issue, not all automatisms that lack conscious will can be viewed as lacking free will. The paper examines whether classical philosophical concepts may weaken the strict determinist approach, which seeks to deny that individuals have free will due to the existence of automatic actions.</p>
</abstract>

Some determinist approaches to free will opine that the human brain is subordinate to physical laws not fully under our control. This results in a weakening of the concept of the personal autonomy and moral responsibility of humans. Were we to acknowledge this assumption, we might consider automatic machines unable to influence the thoughts and intentions from which our actions take root. The key issue lies in the fact that an individual does not consciously engage in particular actions (automatisms), which challenges the concept of free will in an individual’s complex behaviour. Despite this issue, not all automatisms that lack conscious will can be viewed as lacking free will. The paper examines whether classical philosophical concepts may weaken the strict determinist approach, which seeks to deny that individuals have free will due to the existence of automatic actions.

Free will, moral responsibility and automatisms

University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava

Ethics & Bioethics

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Free will, moral responsibility and automatisms"}

Some determinist approaches to free will opine that the human brain is subordinate to physical laws not fully under our control. This results in a weakening of...

Free will, moral responsibility and automatisms

Pubblicato online: 27 mag 2023

Pagine: 83 - 94

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2023-0006

Parole chiave
free will, automatism, moral responsibility, personal autonomy, intentional actions, self-formation

© 2023 Sára Špirková, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Free will, moral responsibility and automatisms

Pubblicato online: 27 mag 2023

Pagine: 83 - 94

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2023-0006

Parole chiavefree will, automatism, moral responsibility, personal autonomy, intentional actions, self-formation

© 2023 Sára Špirková, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Parole chiave
free will, automatism, moral responsibility, personal autonomy, intentional actions, self-formation