[
Boyer, Pascal. 2000. “Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions”. Philosophical Psychology 13(3): 277–97.10.1080/09515080050128123
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Christensen, David. 2007. “Epistemology of disagreement: The good news”. Philosophical Review 116(2): 187–217.10.1215/00318108-2006-035
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Christensen, David. 2011. “Disagreement, question-begging and epistemic self-criticism”. Philosopher’s Imprint 11(6): 1–22.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Elga, Adam. 2007. “Reflection and disagreement”. Noûs 41: 478–502.10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Elga, Adam. 2010. “How to disagree about how to disagree”. In Disagreement. R. Feldman, & T. A. Warfield (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 173–86.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Feldman, Richard. 2006. “Epistemological puzzles about disagreement”. In Epistemology Futures. S. Hetherington (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 216–36.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Feldman, Richard. 2007. “Reasonable religious disagreements”. In Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. L. Antony (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 194–214.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Feldman, Richard and Warfield, Ted A. 2010. “Introduction”. In Disagreement. R. Feldman & T. A. Warfield (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1–10.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0001
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Kelly, Thomas. 2010. “Peer disagreement and higher-order evidence”. In Disagreement. R. Feldman & T. A. Warfield (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 111–74.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Lewis, Shevaun, Lidz, Jeffery and Hacquard, Valentine. 2012. “The semantics and pragmatics of belief reports in preschoolers”. In Semantics and Linguistic Theory Vol. 22: 247–67.10.3765/salt.v22i0.3085
]Search in Google Scholar
[
List, Christian and Pettit, Philip. 2002. “Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result”. Economics and Philosophy 18: 89–110.10.1017/S0266267102001098
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Lyon, Aidan. 2014. “Why are normal distributions normal?”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65(3): 621–49.10.1093/bjps/axs046
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Martin, Tod A., Keating, Jeffrey G., Goodkin, Howard P., Bastian, Amy J. and Thach,
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Thomas W. 1996. “Throwing while looking through prisms: II. Specificity and storage of multiple gaze-throw calibrations”. Brain 119(4): 1199–211.10.1093/brain/119.4.1199
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Pohl, Rüdiger F. 2017. Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing Phenomena in Thinking, Judgment and Memory. Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Rosenberg, Stacy, Vedlitz, Arnold, Cowman, Deborah F. and Zahran, Sammy. 2010. “Climate change: A profile of US climate scientists’ perspectives”. Climate Change 101: 311–29.10.1007/s10584-009-9709-9
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Sosa, Ernest. 2010. “The epistemology of disagreement”. In Social Epistemology. A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press: 278–97.
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Wellman, Henry M., Cross, David and Watson, Julanne. 2001. “Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief”. Child Development 72(3): 655–84.10.1111/1467-8624.00304
]Search in Google Scholar
[
White, Roger. 2005. “Epistemic permissiveness”. Philosophical Perspectives 19: 445–9.10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x
]Search in Google Scholar
[
Wimmer, Heinz and Perner, Josef. 1983. “Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception”. Cognition 13(1): 103–28.10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5
]Search in Google Scholar
