<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In his new book, <italic>Logical Form</italic>, Andrea Iacona distinguishes between two different roles that have been ascribed to the notion of logical form: the logical role and the semantic role. These two roles entail a bifurcation of the notion of logical form. Both notions of logical form, according to Iacona, are descriptive, having to do with different features of natural language sentences. I agree that the notion of logical form bifurcates, but not that the logical role is merely descriptive. In this paper, I focus on formalization, a process by which logical form, on its logical role, is attributed to natural language sentences. According to some, formalization is a form of explication, and it involves normative, pragmatic, as well as creative aspects. I present a view by which formalization involves explicit commitments on behalf of a reasoner or an interpreter, which serve the normative grounds for the evaluation of a given text. In previous work, I proposed the framework of <italic>semantic constraints</italic> for the explication of logical consequence. Here, I extend the framework to include <italic>formalization constraints</italic>. The various constraints then serve the role of commitments. I discuss specific issues raised by Iacona concerning univocality, co-reference and equivocation, and I show how our views on these matters diverge as a result of our different starting assumptions.</p></abstract>

In his new book, Logical Form, Andrea Iacona distinguishes between two different roles that have been ascribed to the notion of logical form: the logical role and the semantic role. These two roles entail a bifurcation of the notion of logical form. Both notions of logical form, according to Iacona, are descriptive, having to do with different features of natural language sentences. I agree that the notion of logical form bifurcates, but not that the logical role is merely descriptive. In this paper, I focus on formalization, a process by which logical form, on its logical role, is attributed to natural language sentences. According to some, formalization is a form of explication, and it involves normative, pragmatic, as well as creative aspects. I present a view by which formalization involves explicit commitments on behalf of a reasoner or an interpreter, which serve the normative grounds for the evaluation of a given text. In previous work, I proposed the framework of semantic constraints for the explication of logical consequence. Here, I extend the framework to include formalization constraints. The various constraints then serve the role of commitments. I discuss specific issues raised by Iacona concerning univocality, co-reference and equivocation, and I show how our views on these matters diverge as a result of our different starting assumptions.

Logic in Natural Language: Commitments and Constraints

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Logic in Natural Language: Commitments and Constraints"}

In his new book, Logical Form, Andrea Iacona distinguishes between two different roles that have been ascribed to the notion of logical form: the logical role...

Logic in Natural Language: Commitments and Constraints

Pubblicato online: 29 gen 2021

Pagine: 277 - 308

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0014

Parole chiave
Formalization, logical consequence, logical form, normativity of logic, semantic constraints

© 2020 Gil Sagi, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Logic in Natural Language: Commitments and Constraints

Pubblicato online: 29 gen 2021

Pagine: 277 - 308

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0014

Parole chiaveFormalization, logical consequence, logical form, normativity of logic, semantic constraints

© 2020 Gil Sagi, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
Formalization, logical consequence, logical form, normativity of logic, semantic constraints