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Social Explanation: Structures, Stories, and Ontology. A Reply to Díaz León, Saul, and Sterken

  
20 giu 2019
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Lingue:
Inglese, Portuguese
Frequenza di pubblicazione:
4 volte all'anno
Argomenti della rivista:
Filosofia, Movimenti filosofici scelti, Filosofia analitica