Pubblicato online: 31 dic 2018
Pagine: 283 - 297
Ricevuto: 16 feb 2013
Accettato: 03 lug 2013
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2013-0021
Parole chiave
© 2013 Víctor M. Verdejo, published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
A well-known (roughly Fregean) strategy for dealing with Kripke’s 1979 Pierre-puzzle is to appeal to differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of Pierre’s beliefs. However, differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of an agent’s beliefs conceal, in this context, another equally challenging puzzle about disagreement. Apparently therefore, theorists are required to pay attention to both sorts of puzzles in order to offer a satisfactory solution to the Pierre case.