<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.</p></abstract>

In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.

Os limites da racionalidade: auto-engano e acrasia

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Os limites da racionalidade: auto-engano e acrasia"}

In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’...

Os limites da racionalidade: auto-engano e acrasia

Pubblicato online: 31 dic 2018

Pagine: 275 - 291

Ricevuto: 06 ott 2009

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2010-0002

Parole chiave
Akrasia, self-deception, irrationality, intentionalism, cognitive bias

© 2010 Vasco Correia, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Os limites da racionalidade: auto-engano e acrasia

Pubblicato online: 31 dic 2018

Pagine: 275 - 291

Ricevuto: 06 ott 2009

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2010-0002

Parole chiaveAkrasia, self-deception, irrationality, intentionalism, cognitive bias

© 2010 Vasco Correia, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
Akrasia, self-deception, irrationality, intentionalism, cognitive bias