<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

In <italic>Practical Ethics</italic> Peter Singer argues for an ‘obligation to assist’:
<italic>First premise:</italic> If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it.
<italic>Second premise:</italic> Absolute poverty is bad.
<italic>Third premise:</italic> There is some absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.
<italic>Conclusion:</italic> We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.
This paper is dedicated to a criticism of four readings of the first premise and an undesirable link the first premise has with the third. The paper ends by offering a alternative formulation of an ‘obligation to assist,’ which suffers from none of these problems.
</abstract>

In Practical Ethics Peter Singer argues for an ‘obligation to assist’:
First premise: If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it.
Second premise: Absolute poverty is bad.
Third premise: There is some absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.
Conclusion: We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.
This paper is dedicated to a criticism of four readings of the first premise and an undesirable link the first premise has with the third. The paper ends by offering a alternative formulation of an ‘obligation to assist,’ which suffers from none of these problems.

Ought we prevent preventable evils?

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Ought we prevent preventable evils?"}

In Practical Ethics Peter Singer argues for an ‘obligation to assist’:
First premise: If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of...

Ought we prevent preventable evils?

Pubblicato online: 31 dic 2018

Pagine: 302 - 314

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2006-0001

© 2006 Charles B. Daniels, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.