INFORMAZIONI SU QUESTO ARTICOLO
Pubblicato online: 30 mag 2014
Pagine: 5 - 22
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/auseb-2014-0001
© 2014
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
We explore the pro-competitive effects of trade policies in a model where a competitive fringe of domestic firms compete with a foreign duopoly exporting vertically differentiated goods. We show that discriminatory nonuniform tariff policies are preferred over the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause because, besides extracting rents from foreign firms, they foster competition in the market. Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs), which favor members relative to non-members, are examples of such nonuniform tariff policies.