In late medieval and early modern Spanish tracts, one repeatedly encounters the ideal of a person »stripped of affects«, who is suitable for the office precisely for this reason. Curiously, therefore, we find the ideal of an emotionless person long before the time in which civil servants even existed as a social group. It is also strange that we find this ideal of an emotionless office holder precisely in the place least expected in the field of traditional research. For Spain lacked important factors usually listed in research on state formation and on the emergence of a civil service as defined by Max Weber, including a successful Reformation, Calvinism, and its associated stoa reception. Spanish research on state formation has addressed the conundrum. Prompted by the work of José Antonio Maravall, reference has been made since the 1960s to the rise of new, professional administrative elites from the outgoing Middle Ages. These so-called letrados, i.e. usually legally educated university graduates, generally of bourgeois origin, would appear to mark clearly the switch from class-based to functional criteria. To a certain extent, they represent the social substrate of Spanish state formation. The letrados also employed a rhetoric that suggested that they were mere function and dedicated themselves to the office selflessly, neutrally and disinterestedly. The concept of ›disinterest‹ (desinterés) marked this new service mentality. It seems to attest to a burgeoning awareness of the state. José Antonio Maravall: »Los ›hombres del saber‹ o letrados y la formación de su conciencia estamental«, in: José Antonio Maravall (ed.): Estudios de historia del pensamiento español. Bd. 1: Edad media, Madrid 1967, pp. 347–380; Pascal Gandoulphe: Au service du roi. Institutions de gouvernement et officiers dans le royaume de Valence (1556–1624), Montpellier 2005.
So what is true? While the older, Weberian interpretation suggested that latitude for behaviour narrowed in office, the more a new ethos of duty developed and personal emotions made way for official routines, the younger, sociohistorical research would appear to claim the opposite, for patronage systems subsisted on those scopes that are attainable in office.
They are based on networks that rely on personal relationships. Without emotionality, it is hard to imagine how such networks can be established and preserved. In the Spanish case, the situation was complicated by the fact that there is no unbroken line from the rise of the letrados to the modern state. Quite the contrary, already in the second half of the 16th century and above all in the 17th century, bourgeois office holders were often once again ousted by the nobility, especially in the higher offices of the court. At the same time, offices could now be bought, which undermined both the principle of selecting the best and clientelism, without completely overriding either. On the urban situation see: Francisco Tomás y Valiente: »La venta de oficios de regidores y la formación de oligarquías urbanas en Castilla (siglos XVII–XVIII)«, in: Historia. Instituciones. Documentos 2 (1975), pp. 525–547. Jean-Pierre Berthe / Thomas Calvo (eds.): Administración e Imperio. El peso de la Monarquía hispana en sus Indias, 1631–1648, Zamora 2011, p. 73. The vast majority of officials were men; however, some women in court service with corresponding titles are known from as early as the 15th century, cf. William D. Phillips Jr.: »State Service in Fifteenth-Century Castile. A Statistical Survey of Royal Appointees«, in: Societas. A Review of Social History 8 (1978), pp. 115–136, at p. 117. Jean-Marc Pelorson: Les ›letrados‹. Juristes castillans sous Philippe III. Recherches sur leur place dans la société, la culture et l’état, Le Puy-en-Velay 1980. Cf. José Ignacio Fortea Pérez: »Los corregidores de Castilla bajo los Austrias. Elementos para el estudio prosopográfico de un grupo de poder (1588–1633)«, in: Studia histórica. Historia moderna 34 (2012), p. 99–146, at pp. 102f., 124–134.
Corregidores were representatives of royal authority, sent by the king to the cities. They acted as judges and also had other controlling and administrative functions. Fortea Pérez: »Los corregidores«; Marvin Lunenfeld: Keepers of the City. The Corregidores of Isabella I of Castile, 1474–1504, Cambridge 1987. Pérez: »Los corregidores«, pp. 111–124.
It is therefore not surprising that questions concerning the suitability for this office and the appropriate forms of behaviour and emotions (pasiones, afectos) were an extensive topic in the tracts dealing with corregidores. By far, the most comprehensive tract was written by Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla (ca. 1546–1605). Despite his noble origins, he decided at an early age on a career as an office holder – first studied law in Salamanca and was initially corregidor in Soria and Guadalajara, then letrado of the Castilian estates and finally fiscal of the Chancillería in Valladolid. Ultimately, in 1597, he published a book about the office of the corregidores, the so-called Política para corregidores, which encompassed almost 2000 pages. In it, the ideal conduct of a corregidor was described: He should, it said, have a distinct sobriety (sobriedad), a moderate demeanour and maintain this moderation when eating and drinking. Jerónimo Castillo de Bobadilla: Política para corregidores y señores de vasallos, en tiempo de paz, y de guerra, y para prelados en lo espiritual, y temporal entre legos, jueces de comision, regidores, abogados, y otros officiales públicos: y de las jurisdicciones, preeminencias, residencias, y salarios de ellos: y de lo tocante a las ordenes, y caballeros de ellas, Bd. 1, Madrid 1775, p. 34. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 37. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 37. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 38. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 40. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 42.
While this series of behavioural rules was aimed at distinguishing the corregidor from the society and its pleasures, it was also emphasised that he should never show disdain to the subjects or demonstrate unfriendliness. Also in other tracts, it was highlighted that corregidores, judges and other representatives of the king may not refuse conversations. Instead, just like the king himself, theoretically, they were to listen cordially to everyone, since ultimately the refusal of communication could be interpreted either as a sign of partiality or lack of interest in the duties that came with office. Fadrique Furió Ceriol: El concejo y consejeros del príncipe. Estudio preliminar y notas de Henry Méchoulan, Madrid 1993, p. 54. Friendly, calm and attentive listening was demanded of Spanish kings and given accordingly. The Venetian ambassador Giovanni Soranzo reported in 1565 on Philipp II: »nel cammino che fa dalla camera alla chiesa dove ode la messa, piglia tutte le supplicazioni che le vengono date, e se alcuno le vuol parlare, si ferma cortesemente per udirlo. Il medesimo usa nell’uscir della chiesa [...]. Nel prender le suppliche si dimostra con faccia molto allegra, e se risponde ad alcuno, lo fa con cortesi e generali parole«, cf. Luigi Firpo (ed.): Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al Senato. Tratte dalle migliori edizioni disponibili e ordinate cronologicamente, Bd. 8, Spagna (1497–1598), Turin 1981, p. 437; on the idealisation of the disinterested king: Jodi Campbell: Monarchy, Political Culture, and Drama in Seventeenth-Century Madrid. Theatre of Negotiation, Aldershot 2006, pp. 108, 126. Thus, it was formulated by Sebastián Malvar, who in 1770, during a eulogy for the deceased Martín Dávila, praised him as a perfect, always disinterested judge. Cf. Sebastián Malvar: El juez de ciencia, de conciencia, y de desinteres. Oracion funebre en las exequias, que la grande Universidad de Salamanca celebró en su Real Capilla de San Geronymo el 16. de Junio de 1770, Salamanca 1770, p. 25.
Therefore, the behavioural art of the corregidor consisted of being present among city society in as neutral manner as possible. This allowed him to discourage any attempt by this society to decipher his feelings and inclinations and thus to question his impartiality. The »deadpan expression« of his face, as María Ángeles Martín Romera summarises it, »would reflect two qualities particularly associated with judges: impartiality and inaccessibility. In order to look impartial and inaccessible, the royal judge must exercise self-restraint, control over his own body and maintain an unreadable face«. María Ángeles Martín Romera: »Embodying royal justice in early modern Spain. Demeanour and Habitus in the instructions for the office of judge«, in: Kay Peter Jankrift et al. (eds.): Natur und Herrschaft: Analysen zur Physik der Macht, Berlin, Boston 2016, pp. 251–274, at p. 252.
Are we looking here at a prototype of »dehumanised« bureaucracy, whose specific character, according to Max Weber, develops all the more completely, the more »love, hate, all purely personal and all irrational elements of feeling, elements defying calculation« are eliminated from official business? Max Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, Tübingen 1980, p. 563. Weber: Wirtschaft 1980, p. 563.
It does not require explanation that, in the Aristotelian tradition, the right measure of emotionality was demanded but rather that the instructions often go significantly beyond that. They idealise the lack or at least the invisibility of emotions. But how can such an escalation, towards the discarding of all affects, be explained? Models for such extreme positions can be detected in three areas, namely, in regard to kings, judges and clerics. On closer inspection, however, we can see that this often concerns only certain emotions or situations. For the clergy, in particular, it is an ambivalent matter: for in principle, affects pave the way to faith. But when these get out of hand or are oriented on the secular, they can soon turn into self-love or libidinous pleasure (concupiscentia) and thus lead to sin. At the same time, we also find here the monastic renunciation of earthly possessions, interpersonal ties, and the emotions these connections entailed. This is illustrated particularly clearly in a phrase that goes back to Jerome and was used later in mendicant and mystical contexts: One should ›follow naked the naked Christ‹ (nudum Christum nudus sequere). Réginald Grégoire / Aimé Solignac: »Nudité«, in: Dictionnaire de spiritualité 11 (1982), pp. 507–518. »Según lo cual serán mejores para consejeros, los que, desnudos de afectos y de pretensiones, pusieren la mira en sólo el bien público«, cf. Pedro Fernández Navarrete: Conservacion de monarquias y discursos políticos sobre la gran consulta que el consejo hizo al señor Don Felipe tercero al presidente, y consejo supremo de Castilla, Madrid 1626, p. 40. »y note que fue puesto desnudo en la cruz, quando exercito Oficio publico, el qual es cruz, y el que administra ha de estar desnudo de todos los afectos proprios, y vestido del amor de los muchos, para imitar al hijo de Dios«, cf. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 267. Here, Carlos Garriga: »Crimen corruptionis. Justicia y corrupción en la cultura del ius commune (Corona de Castilla, siglos XVI–XVII)«, in: Revista Complutense de Historia de América 43 (2017), pp. 21–48, at p. 23. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 267. Carlos Garriga: »Iudex perfectus. Ordre traditionnel et justice de juges dans l’Europe du ius commune (Couronne de Castille, XVe−XVIIIe siècle)«, in: Histoire des justices en Europe 1 (2016), pp. 79–99; Wilfried Küper: Die Richteridee der Strafprozessordnung und ihre geschichtlichen Grundlagen, Berlin 1967, pp. 88–90. Cato van Paddenburgh: »The ideal judge in the 17th century: the example of Gabriel Álvarez de Velasco’s Iudex Perfectus«, in: Glossae. European Journal of Legal History 14 (2017), pp. 648–659, at p. 653. Arndt Brendecke / María Ángeles Martín Romera: »El habitus del official real. Ideal, percepción y ejercicio del cargo en la Monarquía Hispánica«, in: Studia histórica. Historia moderna 39/1 (2017), pp. 23–51.
It is not possible here to present the entire complexity of the societal expectations on judges, the clergy or the court. What is essential is that it is the expectations of the others that are combined in these figures and that determine their scope for emotion. All three groups were subject to increased social observation: Insofar as they each administered a valuable good justice, salvation, favour, etc. the question continuously arose as to the criteria that applied and whether they were emotionally fickle or could even be manipulated. In terms of absolutist France, Jean de la Bruyère described quite strikingly this extreme attention to the smallest sign of affinity or aversion:
Jean de La Bruyère: Les Caractères, Bd. 1, Paris 1805, p. 201.
In Spain, this problem of emotional manipulability was described as one of accessibility. Balthasar Gracián wrote »Feelings are the gate to the soul«. Cantarino, Elena: »Pasión y razón en Baltasar Gracián (a propósito de algunas alegorías de ›el criticón‹)«, in: Atilano Domínguez (ed.): Vida, pasión y razón en grandes filósofos, Cuenca 2002, p. 71–92, at p. 88; Jean-François Senault also describes precisely the problem of the manipulability of the person whose feelings are known: »Ie sçay bien que la Politique nous enseigne des moyens pour arriver a cette connoissance, […]: On iuge des sentiments par les actions, on lit dans les yeux & sur le visage les plus secrets mouvemens de l’ame: on remarque le naturel par les desseins, on estudie si bien les hommes qu’on devine leurs pensées, & qu’on découvre par un artifice ce qu’ils veulent cacher par un autre. Mais de toutes ces voyes, je ne trouve point de plus facile ny de plus asseurée que celle des Passions, car elles échapent contre notre volonté«, cf. Jean-François Senault: De l’usage des passions, Lyon 1669, p. 149. On the dissimulation, see inter alia Fernando de la Flor: Pasiones frías. Secreto y disimulación en el Barroco hispano, Madrid 2005, pp. 123–139. »Que ahora es tiempo que […] ha de encubrir Vuestra Majestad todas sus inclinaciones y afectos, que miran todos con gran cuidado, para que no sepan por dónde han de combatir y cómo se han de prevenir contra sus deseos.« Cf. Baltasar Álamos de Barrientos: Discurso político al rey Felipe III al comienzo de su reinado. Edición de Modesto Santos, Barcelona 1990, p. 80.
The maxims of successful emotional control, or at least the seamless masking of these affects, by no means applied solely to the court. In premodern clientelistic society, it potentially affected everyone and overlapped with the general idealisation of a dignified demeanour with reduced emotional display. The marked gravitas of public appearance was repeatedly noted by French travellers in particular, such as Antoine de Brunel in 1655:
Antoine de Brunel: Voyage d’Espagne, contenant entre plusieurs particularitez de ce royaume, trois discours politiques sur les affaires du Protecteur d’Angleterre, la Reine de Suede, & du Duc de Lorraine, Köln 1666, p. 74.
Not least, a publicly demonstrated reserved use of affects, and the great degree of self-control this implied, was regarded in the Spanish society as a specifically masculine virtue. Mar Martínez Góngora ascribes this in particular to the Erasmus reception, which began in the 1520s, and the associated formation of a new ideal of masculinity, cf. Mar Martinez Gongora: El hombre atemperado. Autocontrol, disciplina y masculinidad en textos españoles de la temprana modernidad, New York 2005.
In all, therefore, it is clear that the striking idealisation of a lack of emotion among Spanish corregidores can by no means be ascribed solely to a single tradition, such as that of the bonus iudex, or to a single function, such as demonstrating impartiality. Rather, it can be understood adequately only when we consider a broader range of political, cultural and social factors. These include the habitual commands of a society strongly influenced by clientelism and a courtly absolutist économie de la grâce. It demanded control over one’s own physical and gestural signals, which would otherwise be read immediately as signs of favour or disfavour. It therefore idealised first and foremost the dissimulatio, the art of concealing one’s own emotions.
Insofar as the corregidores represented the king and the law, such rules applied to them to a particularly strict degree. A greatly reduced use of affects was decisive for them, in order to safeguard the social construction of the office as such. It helped to close the gap between the person and the function of the office and in this way also to stabilise the fiction of objectivity. Where no emotions could be observed, there were no indications of personal motives or relationships, inclinations, weaknesses or possible corruptibility. However, how could it be ensured that the persons exercising public office lived accordingly, with their emotions held in check?
As mentioned, in the 16th century, corregimientos were occupied in almost equal measure by nobles and letrados. Therefore, the virtues and conduct of the corregidores in general could not be ascribed to personal nobility. They had to be demonstrably credible, independent of status, and should correspond with the office itself. Castillo de Bobadilla therefore did not regard nobility itself as a precondition for office but rather the specific nature of the official, which should conform to the nature of the office (naturaleza del oficio). There are abundant metaphors on the nature of public office, e.g. in Francisco Bermúdez de Pedraza: El secretario del rey, Madrid 1620 [ND Madrid 1973] and Juan Josef Sánchez: Nobleza, privilegios y prerogativas del oficio público de escribano, Bd. 3, Valencia 1798. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 31. Pelorson: Les ›letrados‹, pp. 141–143. Here the text follows the iudex est senex argumentation, cf. on this point Küper: Die Richteridee, p. 87. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 97. »juez de ciencia, de conciencia, y de desinteres«. Malvar: El juez de ciencia, 1770, pp. 10–25.
However, a third element comes into play, both with Castillo de Bobadilla and in the eulogy cited above, namely, that of permanent, rigid self-control, a »vigilance over oneself«. »vigilancia sobre si mismo«, cf. Malvar: El juez de ciencia, 1770, p. 34. »gran vigilancia para reprimir los afectos, y pasiones humanas«, Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 249. Castillo de Bobadilla: Política, p. 249. Lorenzo Guardiola y Sáez: El corregidor perfecto […], Madrid 1776, p. 16. »Entrad en su corazon, y vereis una especie de santuario, a donde se retiraba todos los dias, para juzgarse con la mas rigida exactidud«, cf. Malvar: El juez de ciencia, p. 34.
As we have seen, contemporary theory partially accepts the ›social construct‹ of the relevant characteristics of an office holder. It situates it precisely where modern sociology expects to find the development of the specific habitus, in other words in education and academic socialisation. At the same time, however, its argument is more complex, since the socialisation effect applies only under specific conditions. It applies only when, on the one hand, it can build on the base of naturally given dispositions and, on the other hand, when it is subjected ultimately to permanent and strict self-observation.
The focus on a total lack of emotion or interest, which is so confusing at the first glance, is therefore underpinned by a relatively realistic concept, which reflects the personal requirements of the office holder as well as his constantly endangered life praxis. The concept of a person without emotions or interests, in particular the motif of a ›nakedness from affects‹ and the ›disinterested person‹, drew (like the concept of strict and permanent self-control) on models from religious practices.
These multiple references to the model of the clergyman appeared plausible in early modern times, especially since similar expectations of a demonstrable second nature were combined in the clergy and one could draw on a rich seam of motifs and practices there. We should, however, not overlook the differences. Whereas the church could offer a life perspective for those who renounced earthly goods, a royal official could not rely on an equally strong corporation. Ultimately, there was nothing comparable to the church in the secular area that could have effectively replaced family ties, a network of friends and patrons; on the contrary, both the courtly économie de la grâce and city society were based on relationship networks, from which not even the most perfect corregidor could have detached himself completely. It therefore makes sense for analytical reasons to go beyond the identification of such religious motifs and to concentrate more strongly on the social functions of distinctive forms of behaviour and affects.
It is worth recalling here the conundrum formulated at the outset, namely, that the ideal of an emotionless person, reduced completely to his official function, existed long before the age in which civil servants formed a social group. The ethos of the civil servant, therefore, cannot be understood as a consequence of the gradual formation of the relevant professional group. Rather, we can establish that anachronistic elements flowed into this ethos, including those that are much older than administration and statehood themselves.
If we refrain from thinking from the end, in other words from the fully developed civil service of Max Weber, but instead take the premodern as our starting point, it can be seen relatively easily which function was held by affect-reduced behavioural distinction. It was regarded precisely by a strongly clientelistic society as an impressive sign that the official had severed his emotional and economic connection to the society and was loyal to only one person (the king) and principle (justice). In this respect, it was not so much an absence of emotions per se but instead essentially a shifting of these emotions to just one love and loyalty, namely, to the crown and the law.
The ostentation of disinterestedness and emotional control, and of a life oriented on the pure function (for example of jurisprudence), therefore did not develop over the course of centuries alongside or as a consequence of state formation, the development of institutions and the emergence of civil servants as a social group. Rather, it had to emerge particularly intensively from the very outset, since a premodern clientelistic society had much greater expectations on the binding effect of emotions displayed in social interactions than a modern society. The fact that it did not naively assume, at the same time, that such a life, conceived against the rules of society and in part against human nature, cannot be realised consistently, can be seen from the fact that the elements of the formation of such an official nature, in other words virtue, education and habits, were supplemented by an instrument of self-control – the vigilancia sobre si mismo.