<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix <italic>P</italic> by measuring the power consumption. We demonstrate that a similar threat is present in the QC-LDPC variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. We consider a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks information about positions of ones in the secret matrix <italic>Q</italic>. We argue that this leakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix <italic>Q</italic>. In addition, we note that the quasi-cyclic nature of the matrix <italic>Q</italic> allows to accelerate the attack significantly.</p></abstract>

It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix P by measuring the power consumption. We demonstrate that a similar threat is present in the QC-LDPC variant of the McEliece cryptosystem. We consider a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem. We demonstrate that this implementation leaks information about positions of ones in the secret matrix Q. We argue that this leakage allows an attacker to completely recover the matrix Q. In addition, we note that the quasi-cyclic nature of the matrix Q allows to accelerate the attack significantly.

Simple Power Analysis Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem

Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Ilkovičova 3, SK–812-19 Bratislava,

Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Simple Power Analysis Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem"}

It is known that a naive implementation of the decryption algorithm in the McEliece cryptosystem allows an attacker to recover the secret matrix P by measuring...

Simple Power Analysis Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem

Pubblicato online: 25 feb 2017

Pagine: 85 - 92

Ricevuto: 01 dic 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/tmmp-2016-0032

Parole chiave
simple power analysis attack, QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem

© 2016 Tomáš Fabšič et al., published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Simple Power Analysis Attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece Cryptosystem

Pubblicato online: 25 feb 2017

Pagine: 85 - 92

Ricevuto: 01 dic 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/tmmp-2016-0032

Parole chiavesimple power analysis attack, QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem

© 2016 Tomáš Fabšič et al., published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
simple power analysis attack, QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem