<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The paper suggests a method of obtaining an approximate solution of the infinite noncooperative game on the unit hypercube. The method is based on sampling uniformly the players’ payoff functions with the constant step along each of the hypercube dimensions. The author states the conditions for a sufficiently accurate sampling and suggests the method of reshaping the multidimensional matrix of the player’s payoff values, being the former player’s payoff function before its sampling, into a matrix with minimally possible number of dimensions, where also maintenance of one-to-one indexing has been provided. Requirements for finite NE-strategy from NE (Nash equilibrium) solution of the finite game as the initial infinite game approximation are given as definitions of the approximate solution consistency. The approximate solution consistency ensures its relative independence upon the sampling step within its minimal neighborhood or the minimally decreased sampling step. The ultimate reshaping of multidimensional matrices of players’ payoff values to the minimal number of dimensions, being equal to the number of players, stimulates shortened computations.</p></abstract>

The paper suggests a method of obtaining an approximate solution of the infinite noncooperative game on the unit hypercube. The method is based on sampling uniformly the players’ payoff functions with the constant step along each of the hypercube dimensions. The author states the conditions for a sufficiently accurate sampling and suggests the method of reshaping the multidimensional matrix of the player’s payoff values, being the former player’s payoff function before its sampling, into a matrix with minimally possible number of dimensions, where also maintenance of one-to-one indexing has been provided. Requirements for finite NE-strategy from NE (Nash equilibrium) solution of the finite game as the initial infinite game approximation are given as definitions of the approximate solution consistency. The approximate solution consistency ensures its relative independence upon the sampling step within its minimal neighborhood or the minimally decreased sampling step. The ultimate reshaping of multidimensional matrices of players’ payoff values to the minimal number of dimensions, being equal to the number of players, stimulates shortened computations.

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The paper suggests a method of obtaining an approximate solution of the infinite noncooperative game on the unit hypercube. The method is based on sampling...

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Pubblicato online: 24 lug 2015

Pagine: 13 - 19

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ecce-2015-0002

Parole chiave
Systems, man, and cybernetics, Decision theory, Computational efficiency, Mathematical model

© Riga Technical University

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Pubblicato online: 24 lug 2015

Pagine: 13 - 19

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ecce-2015-0002

Parole chiaveSystems, man, and cybernetics, Decision theory, Computational efficiency, Mathematical model

© Riga Technical University

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
Systems, man, and cybernetics, Decision theory, Computational efficiency, Mathematical model