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Defining Metabolic Syndrome: Which Kind of Causality, if any, is Required?

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The definition of metabolic syndrome (MetS) has been, and still is, extremely controversial. My purpose is not to give a solution to the associated debate but to argue that the controversy is at least partially due to the different ‘causal content’ of the various definitions: their theoretical validity and practical utility can be evaluated by reconstructing or making explicit the underlying causal structure. I will therefore propose to distinguish the alternative definitions according to the kinds of causal content they carry: (1) definitions grounded on associations, (2) definitions presupposing a causal model built upon statistical associations, and (3) definitions grounded on underlying mechanisms. I suggest that analysing definitions according to their causal content can be helpful in evaluating alternative definitions of some diseases. I want to show how the controversy over MetS suggests a distinction among three kinds of definitions based on how explicitly they characterise the syndrome in causal terms, and on the type of causality involved. I will call ‘type 1 definitions’ those definitions that are purely associative; ‘type 2 definitions’ the definitions based on statistical associations, plus generic medical and causal knowledge; and ‘type 3 definitions’ the definitions based on (hypotheses about) mechanisms. These kinds of definitions, although different, can be related to each other. A definition with more specific causal content may be useful in the evaluation of definitions characterised by a lower degree of causal specificity. Moreover, the identification of the type of causality involved is of help to constitute a good criterion for choosing among different definitions of a pathological entity.

In section (1) I introduce the controversy about MetS, in section (2) I propose some remarks about medical definitions and their ‘causal import’, and in section (3) I suggest that the different attitudes towards the definition of MetS are relevant to evaluate their explicative power.

eISSN:
0873-626X
Lingue:
Inglese, Portuguese
Frequenza di pubblicazione:
4 volte all'anno
Argomenti della rivista:
Philosophy, Selected Philosophical Movements, Analytical Philosophy