<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs.</p></abstract>

De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs.

De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness"}

De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by...

De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness

Pubblicato online: 06 mar 2018

Pagine: 401 - 422

Ricevuto: 04 lug 2017

Accettato: 06 ago 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0012

Parole chiave
De se, self-ascription, property theory, essential indexical, lived body

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness

Pubblicato online: 06 mar 2018

Pagine: 401 - 422

Ricevuto: 04 lug 2017

Accettato: 06 ago 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0012

Parole chiaveDe se, self-ascription, property theory, essential indexical, lived body

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Parole chiave
De se, self-ascription, property theory, essential indexical, lived body