<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phenomenology. Logue, and Dokic and Martin, respectively, have developed the eliminativist view in different manners. Logue claims that hallucination is a non-phenomenal, perceptual representational state. Dokic and Martin maintain that hallucinations consist in the confusion of monitoring mechanisms, which generates an affective feeling in the hallucinating subject. This paper aims to critically examine these views of hallucination. By doing so, I shall point out what theoretical requirements are imposed on naïve realists who characterize hallucinations as non-visual-sensory phenomena.</p></abstract>

In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phenomenology. Logue, and Dokic and Martin, respectively, have developed the eliminativist view in different manners. Logue claims that hallucination is a non-phenomenal, perceptual representational state. Dokic and Martin maintain that hallucinations consist in the confusion of monitoring mechanisms, which generates an affective feeling in the hallucinating subject. This paper aims to critically examine these views of hallucination. By doing so, I shall point out what theoretical requirements are imposed on naïve realists who characterize hallucinations as non-visual-sensory phenomena.

Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena"}

In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phenomenology. Logue, and...

Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena

Pubblicato online: 06 mar 2018

Pagine: 353 - 381

Ricevuto: 06 apr 2017

Accettato: 19 ago 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0010

Parole chiave
Naïverealism, hallucination, introspection, visual experience, disjunctivism

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena

Pubblicato online: 06 mar 2018

Pagine: 353 - 381

Ricevuto: 06 apr 2017

Accettato: 19 ago 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0010

Parole chiaveNaïverealism, hallucination, introspection, visual experience, disjunctivism

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Parole chiave
Naïverealism, hallucination, introspection, visual experience, disjunctivism