<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The paper aims to determine the extent of the rationality of Vladimir Putin’s decision to begin a war with Ukraine. Its central argument is that this decision was irrational on three levels. Firstly, the Russian decision-making elites failed to foresee the ability of the Ukrainian army and people to resist efficiently. It might have resulted from the imperial superiority syndrome reinforced by the experiences of 2014. Secondly, the elites treated the reports on the Russian army’s combat readiness as reliable and did not make an effort to verify them. Probably no one can determine the scale of the kleptocracy, and therefore no one has reliable data on the quality of the Russian army’s combat preparation. Thirdly, the elites failed to envisage the scale of support for Ukraine from Western democracies. What is more, they did not take into account the democratic rationality of Western politicians. The same politicians who appeared to Putin to be weak and incapable of action, immediately after the mass social protests and condemnation of Russia’s aggression by public opinion, acted following the clearly expressed will of the political nation. The article reflects on the systemic reasons for such a poor definition of the decision-making situation and then tries to formulate the general relationship between the quality of the decision-making elite and the acceleration of the bifurcation processes of the Russian autocratic regime.</p>
</abstract>

The paper aims to determine the extent of the rationality of Vladimir Putin’s decision to begin a war with Ukraine. Its central argument is that this decision was irrational on three levels. Firstly, the Russian decision-making elites failed to foresee the ability of the Ukrainian army and people to resist efficiently. It might have resulted from the imperial superiority syndrome reinforced by the experiences of 2014. Secondly, the elites treated the reports on the Russian army’s combat readiness as reliable and did not make an effort to verify them. Probably no one can determine the scale of the kleptocracy, and therefore no one has reliable data on the quality of the Russian army’s combat preparation. Thirdly, the elites failed to envisage the scale of support for Ukraine from Western democracies. What is more, they did not take into account the democratic rationality of Western politicians. The same politicians who appeared to Putin to be weak and incapable of action, immediately after the mass social protests and condemnation of Russia’s aggression by public opinion, acted following the clearly expressed will of the political nation. The article reflects on the systemic reasons for such a poor definition of the decision-making situation and then tries to formulate the general relationship between the quality of the decision-making elite and the acceleration of the bifurcation processes of the Russian autocratic regime.

Why did Putin go too far? The rationality of Vladimir Putin’s decision to begin a war with Ukraine

Faculty of Political Science and Security Studies

Faculty of Political Science and Journalism

Society Register

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

The paper aims to determine the extent of the rationality of Vladimir Putin’s decision to begin a war with Ukraine. Its central argument is that this decision...

Why did Putin go too far? The rationality of Vladimir Putin’s decision to begin a war with Ukraine

Pubblicato online: 29 ago 2022

Pagine: 57 - 71

Ricevuto: 05 giu 2022

Accettato: 21 lug 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14746/sr.2022.6.3.04

Parole chiave
Russia, Ukraine, war, political decision-making, authoritarianism, cleptocracy, Western militant democracy

© 2022 Roman Bäcker et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Why did Putin go too far? The rationality of Vladimir Putin’s decision to begin a war with Ukraine

Pubblicato online: 29 ago 2022

Pagine: 57 - 71

Ricevuto: 05 giu 2022

Accettato: 21 lug 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14746/sr.2022.6.3.04

Parole chiaveRussia, Ukraine, war, political decision-making, authoritarianism, cleptocracy, Western militant democracy

© 2022 Roman Bäcker et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Parole chiave
Russia, Ukraine, war, political decision-making, authoritarianism, cleptocracy, Western militant democracy