Volume 3 (2012): Issue 1 (December 2012)

The media and the public often make claims regarding the excessive cost increases in the development and production of major weapon systems such as fighter planes, submarines or tanks. The purpose of this research is in assessing the cost increase of such weapon systems during their procurement periods with the help of the Paasche price index. In contrast to other approaches, which focus upon either the specific situations of single weapon systems or cost increases relative to planned budgets, we compare several projects of military services and their cost increases over time to reveal generalisable trends.

For this purpose, we used a framework model that allows for performance and cost comparisons. This paper primarily emphasises the cost perspective by calculating a Paasche index for each chosen project. As a background case for our analysis, we have used the acquisition projects for major weapon systems in Germany. However, the framework model that this study employs is universally applicable.

In contrast to the public perception of cost increases, we could not find any clear trend that would indicate that modern weapon systems have a significantly higher (or lower) cost increase than was the case for projects several decades before. To give brief insight into the empirical findings, the cost increase ratios of the Starfighter and Eurofighter jets have the same level, while cost increase ratios of other weapon systems (APC tanks, submarines) differ significantly (to the worse and to the better) over time. Our findings imply that there is no general trend that today the costs for weapon systems increase more/less than some decades ago. This paper calculates data only from the regarded seven cases therefore we could not question the causes for this observation on basis of our sample. However, it appears that, within a specific service or a specific vehicle type (tank, fighter jet, ship/boat), cost increases may be similar over time.

In December of 2012, North Korea successfully launched a satellite, after failures in 1998, 2009 and 2012. The carrier missiles used during the last three launches are of a new design. Computer simulations of different models for these missiles, using information on the satellite trajectories, show that they require more advanced technology than North Korea has demonstrated previously. This knowledge allows an estimate of the performance of two road mobile ballistic missiles shown during parades in 2010 and 2012. The first, known as the Musudan, theoretically has a range that is considerably larger than the currently operational North Korean missiles. The second, the KN-08, however, is too heavy to be based on the rocket engines used in the missiles used for the satellite launches, which means that it is either a mock-up or that North Korea is developing more powerful engines. The lack of a flight test program makes it unlikely that either of these missiles is close to being operational.

The clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) containing shaped charge warheads poses a particular technical hazard to consider for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel. The wide use of light anti-tank weapons, such as rocket propelled grenades and the scattering of sub-munitions in different conflict areas have made the clearance of shaped charge ammunition a frequent task. However, unlike other hazards, for shaped charges, EOD personnel lack adequate means for the establishment of the maximum hazardous area and for the design of measures for hazard confinement against the shaped charge effect.

In this article two different models are suggested, which together give guidance for protective measures during clearance of shaped charge ammunition. The development of these models is based on their military utility, by consideration of the limited information availability, the short time frames, the working methods and the technology level that are characteristic for EOD operations. The two suggested models are developed further into a complete set of design rules for protective measures, giving a versatile tool to replace today´s rough estimates and guesswork, in these safety-related decisions.