Accès libre

“Even Though”: On the Different Functions of Discounting Expressions in Pro and Con Arguments

   | 06 déc. 2018
À propos de cet article

Citez

Adler, J. (2013). Are conductive arguments possible? Argumentation 27: 245-257.10.1007/s10503-012-9286-3Search in Google Scholar

Blair, J. A. (2016). A defence of conduction: a reply to Adler. Argumentation 30(2): 109-128.10.1007/s10503-015-9368-0Search in Google Scholar

Blair, J. A. & Johnson, R.H. (eds.). (2011). Conductive argument: an overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. London: College Publications.Search in Google Scholar

Botting, D. (forthcoming). The fallacy of sweeping generalization. Presented at the 20th NCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation in Alta, Utah, U.S.A on 20th to 23rd July 2017. In Winkler C. (ed.) Networking Argument, Selected Papers from the 20th Biennial Conference on Argumentation (forthcoming), National Communication Association.Search in Google Scholar

Botting, D. (2012). Wellman’s typology of arguments. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 28(41): 23-43.Search in Google Scholar

Engel, S. M. (1976). With good reason: an introduction to the informal fallacies. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Search in Google Scholar

Hursthouse, R. (1995). Fallacies and moral dilemmas. Argumentation 9: 617-632.10.1007/BF00737782Search in Google Scholar

Stocker, M. (1992). Dirty hands and conflicts of values and of desires in Aristotle’s Ethics. In Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 51-84.10.1093/0198240554.003.0004Search in Google Scholar

Watson, G. (2004a). Responsibility and the limits of evil. In Agency and answerability, 219-259. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0009Search in Google Scholar

Watson, G. (2004b). Two faces of responsibility. In Agency and answerability, 260-288. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.003.0010Search in Google Scholar

Wellman, C. (1971). Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.Search in Google Scholar

eISSN:
2199-6059
ISSN:
0860-150X
Langue:
Anglais
Périodicité:
4 fois par an
Sujets de la revue:
Philosophy, other