<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a theoretical literature on the potential outcomes of first-price relative to English auction, there is a paucity of articles that empirically estimate this relationship. The answer to this question is important not only to economists but also those designing auction for practical application. Using a unique dataset from tax lien auctions in Illinois, I empirically test the effect of a switch in auction type from English to first-price. I find auction revenue is greatly increased, by as much as 22 percent, under the first-price auction. The results are supported by a within county difference-in-difference model specification and are robust when restricting the sample across various specifications</p></abstract>

This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a theoretical literature on the potential outcomes of first-price relative to English auction, there is a paucity of articles that empirically estimate this relationship. The answer to this question is important not only to economists but also those designing auction for practical application. Using a unique dataset from tax lien auctions in Illinois, I empirically test the effect of a switch in auction type from English to first-price. I find auction revenue is greatly increased, by as much as 22 percent, under the first-price auction. The results are supported by a within county difference-in-difference model specification and are robust when restricting the sample across various specifications

From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders

Housing Policy Economist, NAHB, Washington, DC 20005, 1-202-266-8398, Fax: 1-202-266-8575

Review of Economic Perspectives

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a...

From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders

Publié en ligne: 10 juil. 2014

Pages: 105 - 127

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2014-0006

Mots clés
Property Tax Delinquency, Tax Lien Sales, Auction Type, Auction Design

© by Joshua J. Miller

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders

Publié en ligne: 10 juil. 2014

Pages: 105 - 127

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2014-0006

Mots clésProperty Tax Delinquency, Tax Lien Sales, Auction Type, Auction Design

© by Joshua J. Miller

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Mots clés
Property Tax Delinquency, Tax Lien Sales, Auction Type, Auction Design