<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension what they will have made us gain in extension - what exactly does the term “metaphysical” mean here, and can we even hope to provide an exact definition? On the other hand, it would convert our former reservations, which may indeed have been excessive, into a temerity that would ultimately be no less so. The aim we have set ourselves here must therefore be modest: to attempt to avert this twofold risk by first equipping ourselves with a clear and unambiguous concept of what is or could legitimately be understood by the term “phenomenological metaphysics; to show then how and why phenomenology, rightly or wrongly, but without really realizing what was preventing it from doing so, has never really managed to do so; to indicate finally the question that a “phenomenological metaphysics” conforming to its concept would have to ask, and to which it would have to commit itself to answer.</p>
</abstract>

The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension what they will have made us gain in extension - what exactly does the term “metaphysical” mean here, and can we even hope to provide an exact definition? On the other hand, it would convert our former reservations, which may indeed have been excessive, into a temerity that would ultimately be no less so. The aim we have set ourselves here must therefore be modest: to attempt to avert this twofold risk by first equipping ourselves with a clear and unambiguous concept of what is or could legitimately be understood by the term “phenomenological metaphysics; to show then how and why phenomenology, rightly or wrongly, but without really realizing what was preventing it from doing so, has never really managed to do so; to indicate finally the question that a “phenomenological metaphysics” conforming to its concept would have to ask, and to which it would have to commit itself to answer.

The Other of Correlation (Small Prolegomena to any Future Phenomenological Metaphysics)

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The recent liberation of phenomenology’s “metaphysical” word seems to us to present a twofold risk: on the one hand, that of leading us to lose in intension...

The Other of Correlation (Small Prolegomena to any Future Phenomenological Metaphysics)

Publié en ligne: 28 avr. 2024

Pages: 53 - 75

Reçu: 01 oct. 2023

Accepté: 01 nov. 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0011

Mots clés
Phenomenology, Metaphysics, Correlation

© 2023 Grégori Jean, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The Other of Correlation (Small Prolegomena to any Future Phenomenological Metaphysics)

Publié en ligne: 28 avr. 2024

Pages: 53 - 75

Reçu: 01 oct. 2023

Accepté: 01 nov. 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2023-0011

Mots clésPhenomenology, Metaphysics, Correlation

© 2023 Grégori Jean, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Mots clés
Phenomenology, Metaphysics, Correlation