À propos de cet article
Publié en ligne: 05 oct. 2021
Pages: 57 - 81
Reçu: 23 mars 2019
Accepté: 19 juil. 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2019-0004
Mots clés
© 2019 Marco Cavallaro, published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
What are fictional emotions and what has phenomenology to say about them? This paper argues that the experience of fictional emotions entails a splitting of the subject between a real and a phantasy ego. The real ego is the ego that imagines something; the phantasy ego is the ego that is necessarily co-posited by any experience of imagining something. Fictional emotions are phantasy emotions of the phantasy ego. The intentional structure of fictional emotions, the nature of their fictional object, as well as the process of constituting the phantasy ego in representificational acts of consciousness are further elaborated to provide the groundwork for a phenomenological analysis of fictional emotions.