<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article aims at answering the following problem: since for Heidegger the historicity of Being presupposes the withdrawal of the transcendental source of such a historicity, then does Heidegger’s perspective lead to a form of relativism of the kind of an epochal historicism? If on the contrary one judges that for Heidegger there is after all, beyond the ordered unfolding of epochs in the history of Being, an ultimate transcendental or at least trans-epochal dimension, does Heidegger’s thinking lead back to an ahistorical Absolute beyond historicity? In order to answer these questions, I propose to divide Heidegger’s philosophy in three stages, rather than the two stages that have usually been retained by commentators ever since the works of Richardson, in conformity with Heidegger’s own indications regarding the Turning (<italic>Kehre</italic>) of his philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger in the 1930’s develops the notion of machination (<italic>Machenschaft</italic>) and thus gives historicity a hegemonic function in Being’s essential occurrence (<italic>Wesung</italic>), itself understood as the intensification of the program of machination starting in the Greek inceptual thinking and developing itself until today’s planetary technological era. However, after 1945 Heidegger does not think anymore that the truth of Being is entirely determined by historicity and that Being essentially abandons <italic>Dasein</italic> to machination and to its gradual historical unfolding, because there is now according to him, beyond the epochs that are destined to <italic>Dasein</italic>, a trans-epochal giving (and perhaps generous) origin of presence that constitutes the supreme cause for thinking (<italic>Sache des Denkens</italic>).</p></abstract>

This article aims at answering the following problem: since for Heidegger the historicity of Being presupposes the withdrawal of the transcendental source of such a historicity, then does Heidegger’s perspective lead to a form of relativism of the kind of an epochal historicism? If on the contrary one judges that for Heidegger there is after all, beyond the ordered unfolding of epochs in the history of Being, an ultimate transcendental or at least trans-epochal dimension, does Heidegger’s thinking lead back to an ahistorical Absolute beyond historicity? In order to answer these questions, I propose to divide Heidegger’s philosophy in three stages, rather than the two stages that have usually been retained by commentators ever since the works of Richardson, in conformity with Heidegger’s own indications regarding the Turning (Kehre) of his philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger in the 1930’s develops the notion of machination (Machenschaft) and thus gives historicity a hegemonic function in Being’s essential occurrence (Wesung), itself understood as the intensification of the program of machination starting in the Greek inceptual thinking and developing itself until today’s planetary technological era. However, after 1945 Heidegger does not think anymore that the truth of Being is entirely determined by historicity and that Being essentially abandons Dasein to machination and to its gradual historical unfolding, because there is now according to him, beyond the epochs that are destined to Dasein, a trans-epochal giving (and perhaps generous) origin of presence that constitutes the supreme cause for thinking (Sache des Denkens).

Transcendental Philosophy and Epochality : Truth and Historicity in Heidegger

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Transcendental Philosophy and Epochality : Truth and Historicity in Heidegger"}

This article aims at answering the following problem: since for Heidegger the historicity of Being presupposes the withdrawal of the transcendental source of...

Transcendental Philosophy and Epochality : Truth and Historicity in Heidegger

Publié en ligne: 14 oct. 2021

Pages: 99 - 127

Reçu: 12 mars 2018

Accepté: 23 mai 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2018-0005

Mots clés
Heidegger, Ontology, History of Metaphysics, Relativism, Transcendental Philosophy

© 2018 Claude Vishnu Spaak, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Transcendental Philosophy and Epochality : Truth and Historicity in Heidegger

Publié en ligne: 14 oct. 2021

Pages: 99 - 127

Reçu: 12 mars 2018

Accepté: 23 mai 2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2018-0005

Mots clésHeidegger, Ontology, History of Metaphysics, Relativism, Transcendental Philosophy

© 2018 Claude Vishnu Spaak, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Heidegger, Ontology, History of Metaphysics, Relativism, Transcendental Philosophy