<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Do we appear to ourselves in a specific way that requires a phenomenological description? Do we need a phenomenology of self-knowledge? Another way to raise this question about the legitimacy of a phenomenological approach to the Self is to ask whether a philosophical analysis of the linguistic use of the personal pronouns is able to provide a satisfactory account of self-knowledge. Does the linguistic turn make phenomenology superfluous? Discussing the respective merits of the linguistic and phenomenological approaches to the concept of the Self through a crossed analysis of Sartre, Ricoeur, and Descombes, this paper stresses the complementarity between a phenomenological approach that focuses on the way we appear to ourselves and a linguistic analysis of the first-person pronoun. It claims that this relation of complementarity makes both approaches necessary to put forward the paradoxes of self-knowledge.</p></abstract>

Do we appear to ourselves in a specific way that requires a phenomenological description? Do we need a phenomenology of self-knowledge? Another way to raise this question about the legitimacy of a phenomenological approach to the Self is to ask whether a philosophical analysis of the linguistic use of the personal pronouns is able to provide a satisfactory account of self-knowledge. Does the linguistic turn make phenomenology superfluous? Discussing the respective merits of the linguistic and phenomenological approaches to the concept of the Self through a crossed analysis of Sartre, Ricoeur, and Descombes, this paper stresses the complementarity between a phenomenological approach that focuses on the way we appear to ourselves and a linguistic analysis of the first-person pronoun. It claims that this relation of complementarity makes both approaches necessary to put forward the paradoxes of self-knowledge.

Appearing to Oneself (or not). Phenomenology and the Linguistic Turn

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Appearing to Oneself (or not). Phenomenology and the Linguistic Turn"}

Do we appear to ourselves in a specific way that requires a phenomenological description? Do we need a phenomenology of self-knowledge? Another way to raise...

Appearing to Oneself (or not). Phenomenology and the Linguistic Turn

Publié en ligne: 14 oct. 2021

Pages: 139 - 153

Reçu: 24 oct. 2017

Accepté: 27 nov. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0008

Mots clés
Self, First-Person, Subjectivity, Descartes, Sartre, Descombes

© 2017 Pierre-Jean Renaudie, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Appearing to Oneself (or not). Phenomenology and the Linguistic Turn

Publié en ligne: 14 oct. 2021

Pages: 139 - 153

Reçu: 24 oct. 2017

Accepté: 27 nov. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0008

Mots clésSelf, First-Person, Subjectivity, Descartes, Sartre, Descombes

© 2017 Pierre-Jean Renaudie, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Self, First-Person, Subjectivity, Descartes, Sartre, Descombes