<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The author deals with the Brentanian theory of truth, as it is sketched in <italic>On the concept of truth</italic> (1889). He shows how, although entrenched in a deep sense of “real”, this theory moves away from the traditionally to realism assigned “correspondence theory”. Following Brentano and carrying out a systematic comparison of his views to Austin’s ones, he investigates how far, in fact, a strict realism is incompatible with any kind of”correspondence theory”. On the other side, he tries to make some sense of the idea of a truth as “adequacy”.</p>
</abstract>

The author deals with the Brentanian theory of truth, as it is sketched in On the concept of truth (1889). He shows how, although entrenched in a deep sense of “real”, this theory moves away from the traditionally to realism assigned “correspondence theory”. Following Brentano and carrying out a systematic comparison of his views to Austin’s ones, he investigates how far, in fact, a strict realism is incompatible with any kind of”correspondence theory”. On the other side, he tries to make some sense of the idea of a truth as “adequacy”.

Brentano et la théorie réaliste de la vérité

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Brentano et la théorie réaliste de la vérité"}

The author deals with the Brentanian theory of truth, as it is sketched in On the concept of truth (1889). He shows how, although entrenched in a deep sense of...

Brentano et la théorie réaliste de la vérité

Publié en ligne: 02 déc. 2021

Pages: 9 - 29

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2004-0001

© 2004 Jocelyn Benoist, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.