Models developed by probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) are essential tools for quantitatively assessing the safety of the design and the operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs). In PSA, safety is quantified in terms of its inversion, risk, which is usually represented by a specified type of event, which is rare, but has highly undesired consequences (e.g., reactor core damage). A quantitative measure of risk is, then, defined as a frequency or probability of such an event or condition, e.g., core damage frequency (CDF) or core damage probability (CDP) given certain disturbances. PSAs for NPPs are nowadays performed in accordance with well-established normative and guiding documents. Examples of internationally recognized and well-known high-level referential documents for NPP PSA include Refs. [1–3]. As a part of PSA results, risk-importance measures are usually generated for PSA model elements such as equipment failure or human failure events. Generally, a risk-important measure shows how much the calculated risk would change in the case of certain change in reliability or status of considered component (equipment) or human action.
A number of risk-importance measures were defined and used in reliability and risk analyses. Some are related to each other, and some produce the same risk ranking. Their theory and use are described in a number of books such as Refs. [4–6] and in studies or engineer’s handbooks and guidelines such as Refs. [7–9]. Risk-importance measures kept finding their way into different aspects of risk-informed or risk-oriented applications concerning NPP safety, e.g., Refs. [10–12].
In this paper, we focus on those importance measures, which are most widely used in current NPP PSAs. The risk importance of a particular feature (e.g., function, system, component, failure mode, or operator action) can be, most generally, divided into two categories: importance with respect to risk-increase potential and importance with respect to risk-decrease potential. A measure representative of the first category is risk achievement worth (RAW). A representative measure of the second category of risk importance is risk reduction worth (RRW). We will define them according to Ref. [7]:
In the above expression, the terms
Therefore, RAW associated with feature
It is easy to show, in Ref. [13], that the RAW and RRW for a particular failure event
It is pointed out that this relation is established on the basis of the probability theory and is not specific for PSA modeling. The relation is shown in Fig. 1.
Illustration of RRW as a function of RAW with
From the expression (2) above, RAW values would not go above 1/
One of the implications of this discussion is that a large RAW value (possibly implying not well-balanced design from the risk perspective) is really a concern with small failure probability events (because RAW is bounded by 1/
In this paper, we discuss the use of risk-importance measures in achieving a safe design of facility, with due attention paid to the above outlined implications and the main concerns that may come out of them.
Reducing the facility’s risk either at the design stage or at the operating stage is a complex process, which involves a detailed evaluation of the complete risk profile and its contributors. For our purposes, we focus on risk-reduction possibilities through consideration of the discussed importance measures. Typically, risk-reduction options are identified by obtaining a list of plant features (e.g., systems or components) with significant RRW. This is usually done by calculating the RRW values for the representative basic events in the PSA model and sorting them in the decreasing order. The next general step is to find the possibilities for decreasing any significant RRW value. Any significant decrease in such RRW value would, by definition, reflect in significant reduction of the facility’s risk.
Let us consider a situation where a significant RRW was identified for a feature
Decreasing the
Decreasing the
Obviously, any combination of the two strategies can also be considered and used in the practice. However, we will focus on them separately in order to identify and point out to certain aspects or concerns associated with each one.
Strategy 1 is illustrated by Fig. 2. To achieve a decrease in the RRW value of the considered feature
Reducing the risk reduction worth of feature
High RAW values are generally not desirable in design solutions because they mean over-reliance on particular safety features. Thus, there are established and recognized PSA application guidelines, which have set the safety significance threshold already at RAW >2 (e.g., NEI 00-04, Ref. [15]). Over-reliance on certain features means that the overall risk becomes very sensitive upon any degradation of this feature. As a measure of the importance of degradation (e.g., due to aging or environmental conditions), a reliability importance can be considered, which is defined as (e.g., Ref. [13] and its references):
It can easily be shown, Ref. [13], that:
By using the relation (2), this can be rearranged into the form:
Normally,
Strategy 2 is illustrated by Fig. 3. In comparison, it has an important property that the RAW value of feature
Reducing risk reduction worth of feature
In principle, this means that the risk profile of the facility’s new status (with lower risk) would remain, as far as the feature
The above points of discussion of the two basic strategies will be illustrated by a very simple example based on a system for emergency water injection for which a diagram is shown in Fig. 4. The system, which is a part of an operating plant, consists of the pumping station
Diagram of a simple system used as an example.
As a measure of risk,
We will assume that the possibilities are explored for reducing the risk. It can be seen that there is a large risk-reduction potential with regard to the pumping station
On the other hand, the potential for reduction of risk on account of the tank
Two hypothetical options will be considered here, each representing one of the two strategies discussed above. Refer to Fig. 5. Strategy 1 represents increase in the reliability of the existing pumping station
Illustration of two strategies for risk reduction.
New risk values upon implementation of strategy 1 (
With regard to strategy 1, it can be seen that in order to reach the target
For strategy 2, if the same target
Let us now assume that the risk target would be reached at exactly
On the other hand, if strategy 2 is selected, the RAW would be cut almost in half:
RRW initially had a very large value of 11, Eq. (7). The new RRW value will be the same for both strategies, because if success of
Tables 1 and 2 provide a comparison of new values of the RAW and RRW for the two strategies, for five other cases as the new risk is being further reduced to the values smaller than 2E–04. As it can be seen, as the target risk decreases, RAW in the case of strategy 1 would increase even more, while in the case of strategy 2, it would further decrease. RRW would decrease with decreasing target risk, for the reasons discussed above. (Note that the risk target is the same for both strategies and then the parameters are selected correspondingly).
Reliability parameters for preselected new risk targets
Case | Strategy 1 |
Strategy 2 |
|
---|---|---|---|
a | 2.00E–04 | 1.00E–04 | 0.10 |
b | 1.90E–04 | 9.00E–05 | 0.09 |
c | 1.80E–04 | 8.00E–05 | 0.08 |
d | 1.70E–04 | 7.00E–05 | 0.07 |
e | 1.60E–04 | 6.00E–05 | 0.06 |
f | 1.50E–04 | 5.00E–05 | 0.05 |
RAW and RRW values for the cases from Table 1
Case | Strategy 1 |
Strategy 2 |
Strategy ½ |
---|---|---|---|
a | 5000.00 | 500.50 | 2.00 |
b | 5263.16 | 474.21 | 1.90 |
c | 5555.56 | 445.00 | 1.80 |
d | 5882.35 | 412.35 | 1.70 |
e | 6250.00 | 375.63 | 1.60 |
f | 6666.67 | 334.00 | 1.50 |
Additionally, we will take a look at how would a selected strategy reflect on the above-discussed reliability importance, as a measure of degradation of reliability of the pumping station
Reliability importance measure for the cases from Table 1
Case | Strategy 1 |
Strategy 2 |
---|---|---|
a | 1.00E+00 | 1.00E–01 |
b | 1.00E+00 | 9.00E–02 |
c | 1.00E+00 | 8.00E–02 |
d | 1.00E+00 | 7.00E–02 |
e | 1.00E+00 | 6.00E–02 |
f | 1.00E+00 | 5.00E–02 |
As can be seen, in the case of strategy 1, any degradation in the reliability of the pumping station
Use of risk-importance measures in achieving a safe design, particularly in reducing the risk of an operating facility, was illustrated by a simple example. It was shown that beside RRWs, as a means for identifying risk-reduction potential, it is recommendable to verify RAWs in the modified design, in order to prevent over-reliance on single safety features with claimed high reliability. Among other reasons, over-reliance on a single feature means that the overall risk would become very sensitive on any degradation of this feature, e.g., due to aging or environmental conditions.
The simplistic example that was presented points to the importance of diversification of safety functions or features. Additional diverse (alternative) features may not even necessarily have particularly high reliability. In some cases, it may be easier to introduce an alternative success path with flexible or/and movable equipment with relaxed safety classification requirements than to demonstrate that certain risk target is achieved through improved testing, inspection, maintenance, or quality assurance strategies.