Bridging IDF force-design complexities: Blueprint for bottom-up innovation – The emergence of transformational commanders and 5^th Gen CINOs

The discipline of innovation is seen as rather new in the academic literature, and its development, as a theory, is associated with the fields of economics and business administration. The theory of ‘creative destruction’, introduced by economist and political scientist Schumpeter in 1942, places innovation at the heart of economic transformation within capitalism. This concept illustrates the dynamic process through which capitalism incessantly dismantles the old economic order to establish a new, more efficient one. Schumpeter’s theory emphasises the transformative power of innovation, suggesting that economic growth and progress are inherently tied to the continuous cycle of disruption and renewal (Ziemnowicz 2013). The main challenge with ‘creative destruction’ is that it also triggers the wrath of powerful opponents who feel threatened by the frequent changes that the entrepreneur brings about.

Central to this process of ‘creative destruction’ is the figure of the entrepreneur, who is portrayed as a key agent of change. Entrepreneurs are able to act fast and cope with natural opposition to change; they introduce new technology that replaces the old. The entrepreneur drives ‘creative destruction’, relentlessly dismantling traditional methods and making existing ideas, technologies, skills and equipment obsolete in favour of new, innovative approaches spurred by capitalist initiative. The act of constantly destroying and creating is what fuels progress and improvements in the standard of living of the general public.

Schumpeter’s approach, which was published in 1942, was mainly theoretical, since there was no data at the time that could be analysed in order to substantiate the claims; hence, economists did not take the theory seriously. Schumpeter’s ideas gained popularity only in the early 1960s, with the emergence of empirical data and studies that supported his ideas. However, it has only been since the 1990s that innovation theories and their actual implementation had begun attracting serious attention. Since 2013, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have undergone a significant institutionalised innovation revolution, a trend that, in recent years, has also become noticeable within defense forces of Western armies. Some examples are the US Army¹ (AFC 2018), the innovation laboratories in the British Armed Forces (JHUB 2017)², the innovation laboratories in the ³Australian military (2018) and the NATO Innovation Hub ⁴(2022).

Until the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, academic studies in military innovation were dominated by four main schools of thought, focusing on civil–military relations, interservice politics, intraservice politics and organisational culture (Adamsky 2010). However, as suggested in the review conducted by Grissom (2006), there is an entire class of bottom-up innovations that have yet to be explored, understood and explained. Moreover, the integration of institutionalised innovation within modern armies and defense organisations is a new phenomenon that began to show its signs only in the past century. Recently, Horowitz and Pindyck (2023) presented a new framework to classify and understand military innovations as processes rather than outcomes. By focusing on the process of innovation, the authors argue for a more nuanced understanding that encompasses technological, doctrinal and organisational changes within military contexts. A recent publication by Alkaher (2022) endeavours to unveil the underlying methodology that propels the phenomenon of institutional defense and homeland security corporate innovation. This exploration seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms and processes that facilitate innovation in the defense sector. It offers military leaders, through all levels of the chain of command, actionable insights to foster a culture of innovation in their respective organisations; moreover, it offers Chief Innovation Officers (CINOs) actionable insights on how to build and maintain an Organisational Innovation Management System.

Executing relevant and effective force-design processes is a critical task for militaries to maintain their relevance amid a complex and ever-evolving defense landscape. The Israeli J8 directorate is responsible for developing and overseeing the IDF’s multi-year force-design plans. It operates within the IDF in a uniquely dynamic and high-stakes environment, influenced by immediate geopolitical dynamics and rapidly evolving defense challenges that Israel is facing. This approach to force-design is more acutely affected by the region’s geopolitical context compared to the broader strategic scopes of Western military counterparts.⁵ Despite its emphasis on short-term responsiveness, the Israeli J8’s force-design cycle is intimately linked to the tenure of each Chief of Staff. Every Chief of Staff initiates a five-year force-design plan, aimed at navigating the rapidly evolving defense landscape, a pace that can outstrip the plan’s implementation cycle. The continuity and completion of these plans are then challenged by leadership transitions and shifting strategic priorities. Compounded by the staggered tenures of deputy positions, this often results in the incomplete realisation of each five-year vision. This scenario demands a planning and execution framework within the IDF that is exceptionally flexible, capable of adjusting swiftly to both internal shifts and external pressures.

Introduced by the IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi in February 2020, the ‘Tnufa’ five-year plan, also known as ‘Momentum’, marks a significant strategic shift towards enhancing the flexibility of IDF force-design. This initiative reflects the IDF’s dedication to adopting a dynamic and adaptive strategy to tackle the complexities of modern warfare and the changing landscape of regional threats.

At its heart, the ‘Tnufa’ plan heralds a significant doctrinal shift, building on recent enhancements to the IDF’s ‘Decisive Victory Doctrine’. This evolution redefines the concept of victory on the battlefield, explicitly recognising the transformed nature of nonstate threats, especially from armed terrorist groups in Gaza and Lebanon. The plan prioritises augmenting the IDF’s capabilities to counter and neutralise diverse threats effectively, with a particular emphasis on offensive tunnels in strategic areas such as the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. It calls for substantial improvements in intelligence, firepower capabilities, and the capacity to deliver decisive damage to principal adversaries, notably Hezbollah.⁶ Through this focused approach, the ‘Tnufa’ plan demonstrates the IDF’s determination to maintain its technological edge and operational readiness amid the multifaceted challenges of contemporary warfare. Furthermore, the integration of this evolved doctrine with the ‘Tnufa’ plan signals an extensive reform across the IDF, impacting training regimes, branch interoperability, weapons procurement, and civil–military relations. This broad overhaul is strategically designed to fortify the IDF’s preparedness for upcoming challenges, enhancing its resilience and adaptability in a dynamic defense environment.

For years, the primary channels for force design and build-up in the IDF were anchored within its various service branches. Projects initiated by these branches received approval from the General Staff, yet the latter’s influence on the development of warfare concepts was limited. Despite having capable air, land, sea forces, and an intelligence directorate, the IDF recognised that effective solutions often transcended the expertise of individual service branches, necessitating interbranch collaboration.

Another pivotal component of the ‘Tnufa’ plan was to revolutionise this structure within the IDF. The plan introduced a significant strategic overhaul by separating the IDF Planning Directorate from the general staff’s strategic division. This reorganisation served two key purposes: it allocated a general within the general staff to focus exclusively on future force-design, and it created a dedicated planning and design unit to specifically address Israel’s paramount strategic concern, the Iranian threat. This restructured approach highlights the IDF’s dedication to proactive, strategic military planning and the prioritisation of threat response and mitigation. Simultaneously, the IDF recognised the need for a joint, multi-dimensional force-design that transcends traditional combat methods and innovation (CMI) processes. This acknowledgement led to the founding of the CMI division, with two central objectives. The first objective is to reinforce the general staff’s role in force-design, creating a unified vision and agenda for the future armed forces that is derived from a comprehensive and unbiased perspective of the general staff; this vision focuses on anticipating future threats and leveraging technological opportunities, moving beyond the constraints of individual service branch perspectives. The second objective is to foster a culture of innovation within the IDF, optimising the creative energy of its personnel. This division sought to break down the hierarchical and siloed barriers traditionally present in military culture, encouraging the free flow of operational and technological ideas from the bottom-up. The interconnection of these objectives promotes the development of innovative concepts and solutions through the synergistic relationship between top-down strategic oversight and bottom-up creative freedom. This dynamic synergy stimulates an open dialogue of ideas, ensuring that strategic visions and innovative endeavours enhance one another. By effectively bridging the divide between overarching strategic planning and the grassroots innovation of personnel at every level, the IDF has crafted an exceptionally adaptable framework. This framework is designed to rapidly respond to internal developments and external challenges, showcasing the IDF’s capacity to navigate the complexities of modern warfare with agility and foresight.

The main contribution of this study lies in its innovative dual-pronged framework for fostering bottom-up innovation within the IDF. This framework is set against a backdrop of an intricate defense landscape, where the traditional approach of decentralised innovation silos has shown limitations. By emphasising the adoption of transformative commanders’ approach and the establishment of a centralised innovation management system, managed by 5^th generation CINOs (i.e. CINO 5.0), this study not only addresses the need for sustained adaptability in the face of evolving defense threats but also proposes a structured methodology to integrate and amplify innovation efforts across the IDF. Moreover, the study distinguishes itself by offering a sociological perspective on military transformation, analysing the interplay between organisational culture, individual innovators, and institutionalised routines. This perspective sheds light on the multifaceted nature of innovation in the military context, where human factors, systemic structures and technological advancements converge.

In essence, the study provides a roadmap for the IDF’s transition from an environment of isolated innovation efforts to a cohesive, strategically guided innovation ecosystem. This holistic approach not only aims to enhance the IDF’s operational effectiveness and agility but also sets a precedent for other military and defense organisations grappling with similar challenges of innovation and transformation in a rapidly changing global security environment.

The structure of this study is organised as follows: The ensuing section provides detailed methodology for this study, utilising the systematic operative design approach. Next, the following section explores the sociological underpinnings crucial for catalysing a bottom-up innovation revolution within the IDF. This exploration delineates two distinct categories of agents of change pivotal to this process: transformational leaders and innovation managers. Following this, the innovation management system established by the CMI division is detailed, underscoring its significance in streamlining innovation efforts across the IDF. Further, the discourse extends to an in-depth examination of the first type of ‘Agents of Change’ – the transformational leaders. This is complemented by a detailed analysis of the second type – the ‘Intraorganisational Innovation Managers’ (CINO 5.0), illustrating their roles, strategies and impact on fostering a culture of innovation within the IDF. Next, a genealogical analysis is carried out. This analysis focuses on how the IDF evolved into an organisation that actively promotes bottom-up innovation, marked by the establishment of an institutionalised innovation management system operated by 5^th generation CINOs under the auspices of the CMI Division. Subsequently, a dual-pronged framework for fostering bottom-up innovation within military organisations is proposed. This innovative framework introduces two synergistically linked systems: the ‘Change Agent System’, which is grounded in sociological principles, and the ‘Organisational Innovation Management System’, based on organisational systems engineering fundamentals. The article culminates with a summary of the key findings and contributions.

This foundational step involves immersing into the problem or challenge at hand, gathering relevant information and understanding the issue from multiple perspectives. It emphasises constructing a new understanding of the strategic context to identify and formulate relevant strategies. This phase is crucial for laying the groundwork for effective change, ensuring that efforts are grounded in a comprehensive understanding of the current state and the desired outcomes. In the context of the IDF, this phase corresponds to the initial acknowledgement of the need for a transformative approach towards innovation, particularly in addressing the limitations of the traditional force-design five-year plan, which often struggles to keep pace with the rapidly evolving defense landscape and technological advancements. This realisation led to the establishment of the CMI division, aimed at infusing agility and adaptability into the IDF’s strategic planning and execution processes.

Central to the IDF’s transformation are the agents of change, who act both individually and collectively to spearhead change across the organisation. These agents can be categorised into three distinct groups: transformational leaders, innovation managers and the organisational intrapreneurs. The transformational leaders play a key role in fostering a climate of psychological safety, where new ideas are not just welcomed but highly valued. In addition, innovation managers provide the structural support and mechanisms necessary to bring these ideas to fruition, carefully guiding initiatives from their early concepts all the way towards implementation.

This step centres on recognising opportunities that can be leveraged to advance the organisation’s interests. The emphasis is on identifying and unlocking the potential for change. In the context of the IDF, this step emphasises the strategic enhancement of the IDF’s agility and innovation capacity through the deliberate cultivation of the two pivotal cadres of change agents: the transformative commander (transformational leaders) and the 5^th generation CINO (innovation managers).

Together, these cadres of change agents embody the IDF’s commitment to harnessing the potential for change. Transformative commanders provide the leadership and vision necessary to inspire innovation at all levels, while 5^th generation CINOs offer the structural and strategic framework required to capture and implement these innovations effectively. This synergistic relationship between transformative leadership and structured innovation management epitomises the IDF’s strategic approach to realising its potential for change, ensuring that the organisation remains adaptable, responsive and at the forefront of military innovation in an ever-evolving defense landscape.

At this step, the focus shifts to identifying the gap between current perceptions and the evolving reality. It involves analysing historical data and trends to understand how the problem or challenge has changed over time (Finkel and Ortal 2019). This phase is pivotal in adjusting perspectives and aligning strategies with current and future realities, thereby setting the stage for relevant and impactful actions. In the context of the IDF, it entails acknowledging the limitations of decentralised innovation efforts and the necessity for a more integrated, institutional approach. The evolution from 4^th to 5^th generation CINOs represents this shift towards recognising the relevance gap in innovation management. This phase is critical for the IDF, as it necessitates an understanding of how past innovation efforts, while fruitful, may not fully meet the current and future challenges of warfare and defense. By identifying this gap, the IDF sets the stage for systemic changes in its approach to innovation.

The final step involves formulating a detailed practical strategy. The focus is on translating insights into actionable steps and executing the strategy in a cohesive campaign to effectively address the identified issues and leverage opportunities. In the context of the IDF, this involves the execution of the dual-pronged framework for fostering bottom-up innovation, while ensuring that these innovations are embedded within the IDF’s strategic force-design framework. This step represents the culmination of the IDF’s operative design journey, where the structured innovation efforts are now poised to yield tangible outcomes, enhancing the military’s operational capabilities and strategic flexibility. Through this process, the IDF demonstrates a comprehensive approach to innovation, one that is not only responsive to internal developments and external challenges but also anticipates future needs, ensuring sustained strategic advantage.

Central to the IDF’s transformation are the agents of change, who act both individually and collectively to spearhead change across the organisation. These agents can be categorised into three distinct groups, each playing a unique role in the transformation process (Power 2014):

Transformational leaders: These individuals create an inspiring context for their teams, motivating them to embrace and contribute to the transformation efforts.

In the context of military organisations, the success of intrapreneurs is largely recognised by the roles of the transformational leaders and innovation managers. While transformational leaders play a key role in fostering a climate of psychological safety where new ideas are not just welcomed but highly valued, innovation managers provide the structural support and mechanisms necessary to bring these ideas to fruition, carefully guiding initiatives from their early concepts all the way towards implementation. Furthermore, it is critical to understand the impact of decisions made purely on command, as highlighted by Grint (2020). Decisions that lack the insight provided by innovation managers risk stifling the innovation process. The synergy between transformational leadership and innovation management is crucial for minimising resistance and maximising the effectiveness of bottom-up innovation. This dynamic ensures that ideas are not just created but also successfully implemented, allowing organisations to fully leverage the benefits of a bottom-up innovation approach. The forthcoming section will focus on these two change agents and their combined efforts to champion bottom-up intrapreneurial endeavours within the military context.

The contemporary era demands a shift from a technologically deterministic view to an anti-essentialist approach, placing equal emphasis on human factors and technological capabilities. Technological determinism is a theoretical framework that posits technology as the primary driver of societal changes and developments. In contrast, an anti-essentialist approach rejects the idea that technology has an inherent essence that determines its impact on society. Instead, it emphasises the role of human agency, cultural contexts and social structures in shaping technological development and its societal implications. In other words, technology per se cannot be expressed itself, and it is unable to affect an organisation’s reality. It is the differentiated interpretation that each of us attach to that technology and the way it is used that acts as the source of its power (Frenkel 2013). Consequently, in many cases, the transformational leaders are there to mediate between technological or non-technological solutions and an emerging operational requirement, until the operational loop is completed due to the need for a concrete solution that can be implemented on the ground. For this reason, those ‘agents of change’ within the organisation must have an entrepreneurial orientation that is neither technology-averse nor completely reliant on technology. Moreover, they must be experts on methods, methodologies and language and assist with accelerating organisational innovation while neutralising opposition to change. Their role is multifaceted, involving the creation of a liminal space that provides a platform for intrapreneurs and promotes spontaneous and flexible thinking. Here, they must be prepared to challenge existing thought paradigms (Nicolet 2018). Moreover, they need to ensure that all those involved in innovation are doing their work in accordance with the organisation’s directive, while minimising redundancy (Rietzschel et al. 2014).

Recognising the importance of a systematic approach to innovation, the IDF has established an array of innovation managers under a unified professional entity. Their work involves creating systematic mechanisms that enable these transformation processes in practice, doing so holistically, with a pan-IDF perspective. The emphasis here is on institutionalising innovation mechanisms that make adaptability and resilience second nature to the IDF, enabling it to meet emerging challenges effectively. This approach is grounded in a sociological paradigm that views the development of new knowledge as a product of the encounter between human ‘actors’ and developing technologies. This encounter plays a major role in shaping the technology and ‘selling it’ to the organisation (Latour 1987). In the IDF, this translates into a direct engagement between operational units and the agents of change, facilitating the adoption of disruptive technologies through agile and lean methodologies. The outcome is a set of innovative combat methods and concepts that are not only effective locally but can also be scaled and integrated across the organisation.

The IDF’s innovation revolution is supported by adopting a directive and change logic, identifying adapted innovation mechanisms, and forming collaborations that support the change process. This echoes Kuhn’s claim on the emergence of scientific revolutions at a time of increasing complexity and a massive surge in information that creates an explosion of information, and a multiplicity of players, data and sensors in the digital age (Morabito 2015). This era requires many different holistic perspectives, not just on the output of knowledge development processes, but also on the processes themselves. These nuanced perspectives will allow for the institutionalisation of change; that is, putting it into full-scale production as something that is ‘second nature’ to the organisation, while neutralising change resistance processes and fears of the unknown and the unfamiliar (Kuhn 1962).

For a culture of innovation to be encouraged in the IDF, it is imperative that there exists a profound organic solidarity between the various parts of the organisation, with an emphasis on ‘agents of change’ working to accelerate transformation processes in the organisation. Here, we take a bird’s eye view of the organisation and rely on papers written by Simmel and Durkheim. Simmel, whose work was influenced by the plastic arts, argued that society or organisations change constantly, and that we must perceive them as part of nature, which is dynamic (Simmel 1950). Durkheim, a sociologist who dealt extensively with the issue of collective consciousness and its impact on the society and culture in which it exists, argued that there are two types of divisions of labour in society. The first is mechanical division, in which each individual performs his or her role differentially, in a way that sets themselves apart from other individuals around them. The second is organic, in which there are interdependencies between individuals, enabling and encouraging greater social survivability. In other words, the organisation is akin to a living organism, and its organs are all interdependent, a fact that contributes to the organism’s survivability and prosperity (Durkheim 1982).

One of the most sought-after jobs that have emerged in recent years under the C-Suite category in organisations and corporations is the role of Chief Innovation Office (CINO). The term CINO was first coined in 1999 (Liyanage et al. 1999), with respect to the evolution of the 4^th generation of the intraorganisational R&D management model. While the 1st generation (1950s–1960s) centred on managing the R&D process itself, the subsequent shift in the 2nd generation (1960s–1980s) pivoted towards enhancing project management and quality. Progressing further, the 3rd generation (1980s–1990s) embedded business strategy perspectives, signifying a holistic integration of R&D activities with overarching business goals and strategic initiatives. Finally, the 4^th (since 1990s) generation model expands on the previous models, to encompass innovation in technology or organisation, through the intake, integration and management of knowledge coming from outside of the firm (Chen et al. 2015). According to Liyanage et al. (1999), management in the 4^th generation R&D model is not based solely on ‘transferring knowledge’ into the organisation and managing it strategically, but also on managing networking and interactions between people in the organisation and strengthening the ties between R&D processes and the organisation’s ‘innovation systems’.

Within the past two decades, since the beginning of the current millennium, about 52% of the Fortune 500 companies have vanished, gone bankrupt or have lost their former glory and their relevance by losing a significant market share.¹⁸ This illustrates how difficult it is for companies to survive through the changes occurring in a competitive market, but it also underscores the need for a senior management function whose role is to drive forward transformative innovation processes in an environment replete with change and uncertainty. This is how CINOs ended up in the C-Suite category at companies and organisations, based on these organisations’ clear-cut motivation to ‘reinvent themselves’ and safeguard their standing over time in the ‘Fortune 500’ list.

To create a solid foundation for promoting innovation processes, organisations and corporations began appointing innovation managers (Maier and Alexander 2018). However, as an emerging field, such managers possessed little knowledge in the practical execution of innovation processes. Thus, their evolving role has been defined in various ways. The role of the ‘chief innovation officer’ was created in response to a market that was shifting rapidly, and was fuelled by the technology revolution. The pace of the technological revolution consistently reduces the amount of time it takes to launch new products, and consistently shortens the time in which customers expect to receive services and deliverables. It leads to a competitive world that makes it necessary to adopt transformative and adaptive approaches. CINOs are responsible for managing the intraorganisational innovation process, and their role is to allow organisations to keep up with the pace of change by identifying business opportunities presented through the integration of new ideas into the organisation’s existing infrastructure and processes. The words ‘chief’ and ‘officer’ indicate that the person filling this role operates throughout the organisation and is responsible for driving innovation everywhere in the organisation. This allows him/her to bridge between different silos.

Surveys conducted among global companies that have managed to make their way to the ‘Fortune 500’ list can teach us a few things about the evolution of the CINO role’s status (Hill and Barton 2013). While these companies had a rather limited understanding of the role of the CINO at the beginning of the millennium, about 10% of ‘Fortune 500’ companies had already appointed CINOs by 2010. In 2016, that number grew to 45%, and was estimated at 85% in 2018¹⁹.

In a review published by the Harvard Business Review (Lovric and Schneider 2019), the authors specified six different CINO archetypes that can now be identified in large corporations and organisations, namely the researcher, the engineer, the investor, the advocate, the motivator and the organiser. Another review published in this journal spoke of the dual role that CINOs play in their organisations; they both fundraise and acquire legitimacy for their activities from both the management and the units within the organisation (Di Fiore 2014). According to Soren Kaplan²⁰, the CINO usually has three main roles. The first is accelerating the organisation’s growth opportunities by identifying, prioritising, developing and launching new products, services and business models. The second is creating tracks and shaping routines by developing, nurturing and deploying mechanisms in the organisation that support and accelerate internal innovation. The third is positioning themselves as innovation angels by sponsoring entrepreneurial talents (‘innovation champions’) in the organisation. These roles help the organisation achieve the following goals:

Adopting an innovation strategy and supporting it through the organisation’s senior management, employees, customers and partners.

In a review published by the Harvard Business Review (Hill et al. 2014), the authors²¹ specify six paradoxes (i.e., tensions) that CINOs deal with in their organisations, which are tied to the tension between the organisation’s need to create a sense of urgency and enlist support and action, versus the human need for freedom of operation. According to the review, the CINO must constantly deal with balancing and calibrating the tensions between these six paradoxes in order to motivate the people in the organisation to engage in relevant innovation, without affecting their sense of being able to operate freely.

The open literature proposes five central components tied to evaluating the CINO’s efficiency²²: high trustworthiness, the ability to see and communicate the future, the ability to propel ideas and take action to fulfil their vision, the ability to identify and neutralise the opponents to innovation in the organisation, and the ability to build bridges and make connections. A qualitative study performed recently within the Israeli ecosystem found that innovation managers in Israel currently rely on liquid professionalism to create professional legitimacy (Rittblatt 2021). Legitimacy is not founded on the standard development track. Rather, it is achieved by maintaining flexibility when handling constraints, and by creating extensive collaboration within the Israeli innovation management ecosystem. The results of the study are not surprising, in light of the fact that innovation management is a nascent field. The CINO that acts according to the 4^th generation intraorganisational R&D management model, while characterised as talent with archetypical strengths, is defined in this article as CINO 4.0 (or 4^th generation CINO).

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) sets and codifies international industrial and commercial standards. In all, 165 countries have representatives in the ISO, and the standards that the organisation issues are frequently adopted as binding policy governing the management of management projects in business, commercial, community, health and security settings. In 2020, the ISO completed the fifth standard in an important family of standards, the ISO-56000^23,24, which covers the management of innovation systems in organisations. It was written as an international quality standard for innovation management in organisations, providing guidelines for the establishment, implementation, maintenance and continuous improvement of an innovation management system for use in all established organisations. The standard applies to organisations seeking to produce lasting success, by developing the ability to effectively manage effective innovation activities in order to fulfil the organisation’s directive. The primary motivation for the launch of this standard is to ensure that these organisations remain relevant in a constantly changing world. If no new products or services are being created, organisations may continue doing ‘more of the same’, while disregarding the changes that have occurred with respect to market forces, demand, customer needs and the competition from their competitors’ offerings. That is why it is so important to defense organisations and corporations as well.

According to a number of sources (Voehl et al. 2018; Benraouane and Harrington 2021; Harrington and Voehl 2021), the management of the innovation process in an organisation is comprised of a group of mechanisms, from locating opportunities within the organisation to being able to create value. These mechanisms enable the organisation to identify relevant opportunities and systematically transform them into projects. Ultimately, this process derives value by effectively introducing and assimilating the innovation to users and customers.

Academic studies that have examined the potential of ‘islands of innovation’ to impact the inculcation of innovation in the organisation claim that these islands harbour a negative potential (Avidov-Ungar and Eshet-Alkakay 2011). These may end up hampering the proliferation of innovation, mainly in organisational systems characterised by loose internal links, and in cases of expectation gaps and conflicting interests among those partnering to implement innovation. This will happen if they do not coordinate and operate synergistically. With that in mind, and as local groups began forming in the IDF since 2013, a staff paper²⁵ was drafted in 2017 in the IDF, led by Maj. Gen. Haliva, which dealt with advancing innovation-promoting processes and creating protected investment spaces that could tolerate the chance of a failure occurring in the IDF²⁶. Some of the team’s conclusions were published by Brig. Gen. Moti Baruch and Col. Eran Ortal in an article entitled ‘Ocean of Innovation’, which appeared that year in Maarchot (Baruch and Ortal 2017). This article discussed the way the disruptive innovation theory could help the IDF with its force build-up. Moreover, the article states that naturally, the IDF’s service branches and directorates are able to initiate and speed up local innovation processes that are restricted to their traditional areas of responsibility.

The need to string together the islands of innovation in the IDF as an archipelago that acts like one complete organism led the IDF in 2021 to develop and nurture a new type of CINO. The professional legitimacy of these CINOs, in the eyes of the IDF, shifted from liquid professionalism to institutional professionalism. In other words, the approach of locating and placing archetypical talents in intraorganisational innovation manager roles (CINO 4.0), which creates ‘innovation islands’ with a local and unidimensional orientation, gave its way to the CINO 5.0 generation. A new generation of CINOs with an intraorganisational leadership, innovation management skills and holistic orientation view.

The CINO 5.0 is a generation that started developing professionally in the military as a general staff array, and it draws legitimacy from the organisation for its activities and its accreditation. It operates in the aim of ensuring the IDF’s superiority, resilience and momentum, by systematically planning, creating and managing mechanisms, tracks and routines.

The main factors and constraints that contributed to this decision: First, what is needed is someone from within the organisation who has first-hand knowledge of the complexities, dilemmas, abilities, and organisational DNA, can make connections intuitively and can accelerate interdisciplinary collaboration while breaking down barriers and creating solidarity. Second, there is a growing trend of defense organisations and corporations developing their CINOs in-house, because they do not have the flexibility of drawing upon outsourced talent. Third, regulatory agencies in Israel and elsewhere are increasingly demanding that international standards such as ISO 56002:2019 are to be adopted and implemented in the innovation ecosystem.

The primary focus of the new generation of CINOs, in the general staff divisions and service branches, remains on developing the organisation from where they have originate. However, their approach is set within a broader corporate context at the general staff level. This approach aims to amplify the potential for the IDF to grow as a unified entity (a single organism). These CINOs aim to act as a coordinated and decentralised array, optimising a range of opportunities: first, boosting intraorganisational effectiveness while strengthening partnerships between the relevant service branches and general staff divisions; second, enhancing the potential for partnerships and links between service branches and/or general staff divisions and alumnus associations, along with their reserve arrays; third, accelerating open innovation and fostering connections to the ecosystem, reserve experts, academia and industry; and fourth, empowering partnerships with R&D and academic personnel from both inside and outside the defense establishment, including industry, academia, venture capital funds, start-up companies and government ministries.

From 2022, CINOs in the service branches and general staff divisions are required to undergo gradual, in-depth and professional training by the IDF (in stages). This includes accreditation to lead and manage ‘innovation management systems’ and design organisational mechanisms, providing the relevant theoretical academic knowledge and tools, and imparting practical skills. The following are the area of responsibilities that are defined by the IDF²⁷ for these CINOs in the service branches and general staff divisions:

Conducting intraorganisational study surveys and internal audits based on ISO 56002:2019.

This marks a significant shift in the IDF, as the service branch chiefs and general staff division heads must appoint those who are best suited to this important role and allocate the needed resources, platform, accessibility and attention to ensure they succeed in their tasks. Creating opportunities for direct, long-term discourse between CINOs and the heads of service branches and general staff divisions is crucial. It equips them with an organised directive regarding selected transformation efforts, through a top-down approach, while shaping a culture of innovation that encourages practical, bottom-up entrepreneurship.

This section discusses the genealogy that led the IDF to become an organisation that promotes bottom-up innovation through the establishment of an institutionalised innovation management system, operated by the 5^th generation CINO under the auspices of the CMI Division.

Since its establishment (beginning at the time of the pre-state paramilitary organisations), the IDF has demonstrated adaptability and an ability to learn that have guaranteed its superiority and robustness throughout all of Israel’s wars. Concurrently, the organisation was able to integrate remarkable innovation in its force build-up and employment processes, in practice. However, it was only in 2013 that the surge in institutionalised innovation began in the IDF, with the establishment of the first innovation section in the IDF, in the general staff of the Israeli Air Force²⁸. Starting in 2017, a considerable number of innovation silos (islands) began to form within the service branches and general staff divisions of the IDF, driven by the efforts of the 4^th generation of CINOs. These included the Israeli Air Force (IAF)’s Base 108, Ofek 324, the combat laboratory in the IDF Ground Forces’ Technology and Logistics Division, the Technology and Maintenance Corps HQ, the Medical Corps HQ, the C⁴I and Cyber Defense Directorate, the Military Advocate General’s Corps, the Home Front Command, the Yahalom unit and more. Each of these islands were formed either through directives from commanders of units or service branches or from grassroots groups of innovation-driving entrepreneurs. The rationale followed by those innovation formations was to assimilate a culture of local innovation, hoping that it would set an example for others and pervade into the rest of the organisation, imbuing it with the values of innovation and entrepreneurship that would lead to systematic, relevant and effective transformation. The islands of innovation, in the form of innovation sections, strove to inculcate a culture of innovation in various ways, such as promoting internal innovation efforts by carrying out innovation events and technological happenings, in collaboration with the innovation ecosystem in the defense establishment and elsewhere in Israel^29,30 (Machanet, Innovation Week³¹, unconferences³², hackathons³³ and more), creating acceleration tracks and boosting grassroots projects (e.g. the IAF accelerator, IAF innovation hub technological incubator^34,35, the technology incubator in the J2 directorate, the Innovation Lab in the J4 directorate and more), the establishment of a range of content-based communities as a platform for accelerating changes^36,37 and nurturing relationships with veterans of units specialising in entrepreneurship and innovation (the establishment of the reserve innovation recon units^38,39 and connecting with the innovation spaces of military unit alumni associations)⁴⁰.

The innovation sections led by the 4^th generation CINOs displayed varied levels of success in driving effective, systematic and relevant transformations within their respective service branches, staff divisions and territorial commands. This variation primarily stems from two factors:

What type of person is leading them, what professional training has that person received for their job and how their areas of responsibility or jurisdiction are defined (i.e. is this part of their job description, or is it something extra they was tasked with).

This variation has led to a trend where cardinal innovation sections have dwindled or been dissolved. Nevertheless, several sections, entities and groups have successfully sparked widespread change and achieved notable outcomes on both local and joint levels, including the Ground Forces’ innovation lab, the IAF’s accelerator and tech incubator and the Innovation Month at the Home Front Command, among others.

Starting in 2022, the management approach of the innovation silos within the service branches and general staff divisions began transitioning to the 5^th generation of CINOs, facilitating a re-evaluation and potential restructuring of innovation sections that had previously dwindled or dissolved. The transition from 4^th generation to 5^th generation CINOs within the IDF, from 2013 until 2023 is depicted in Figure 1. The decline in the number of 4^th generation CINOs suggests a trend towards the diminishing or dissolution of innovation sections.

Fig. 1:

The IDF Chief of Staff’s Innovation Competition Award, established in 2020, not only serves as a platform for recognising and incentivising innovation within the Israeli military but also as a barometer for the shifting tides in the IDF’s approach to innovation management. By analysing the thematic evolution of the competition from 2020 to 2023, we observe a distinct paradigm shift from a broad, holistic approach towards a more focused, quality-oriented and implementation-centric innovation strategy. This section delves into this evolution, drawing implications for the IDF’s changing priorities and strategies in fostering innovation. This paradigm shift reflects the IDF’s evolutionary understanding of innovation’s role in ensuring the IDF’s agility, readiness and effectiveness in a rapidly changing security environment.

The inaugural 2020 competition⁴¹ set a wide stage for innovation, encouraging a diverse array of ideas across multiple operational and organisational domains. The 2020 competition was organised into six categories: force build-up, operations, training, people, outstanding units and responses to the Chief of Staff’s challenges (with a top-down approach). This broad approach underscored an understanding of innovation as a holistic endeavour, permeating every facet of military operations and management. However, by 2021⁴², the competition’s theme, ‘Doing Innovation’, signalled a strategic narrowing of focus. Concentrating on practical, implementable innovations, especially those enhancing operational efficiency and emphasising the human element, reflected a shift towards actionable outcomes over theoretical ideation. This move underscored the IDF’s recognition of the immediate value derived from innovations.

The theme ‘Accelerating Innovation’ in 2022⁴³ marked a further evolution, highlighting the importance of agile processes. By celebrating contributions that promote entrepreneurship with practical innovation and incorporating categories such as culture and values, the IDF demonstrated a commitment to embedding innovation into the very fabric of its organisational culture. This year also introduced recognition for theoretical contributions, suggesting an appreciation for the foundational intellectual work that supports practical innovation.

The projected theme for the 2023⁴⁴ competition, ‘Precision, Quality, and Implementation’, epitomises the culmination of this evolutionary trajectory towards a strategic, quality-focused and implementation-driven approach to innovation. This theme underscores a prioritisation of innovations that are not only pragmatically viable but also executed with precision and quality, aligning closely with the IDF’s strategic goals and operational effectiveness. The emphasis on organisational efficiency in the competition categories reflects an acute awareness of the need for innovations that bolster the IDF’s operational and organisational frameworks.

This evolutionary analysis reveals a significant paradigm shift in the IDF’s innovation management goals, moving towards a focused strategy that prioritises the practical implementation of high-quality, efficient solutions. This shift indicates a mature approach to innovation, where the value of ideas is measured not just by their novelty but by their tangible contributions to the IDF’s strategic objectives and operational needs.

The transition towards a more refined, implementation-centric approach to innovation management within the IDF mirrors broader trends in military innovation, where the effectiveness of innovation efforts is increasingly evaluated based on their direct impact on operational readiness and strategic flexibility. This shift also suggests an evolving understanding of innovation as a strategic asset, one that must be meticulously cultivated, managed and aligned with the overarching goals and challenges facing the military organisation.

By harmonising these two systems, militaries like the IDF can enhance their agility, responsiveness and effectiveness in an increasingly complex defense environment. The ‘Change Agent System’ cultivates intrapreneurs, while the ‘Organisational Innovation Management System’ provides the structural backbone that transforms intrapreneurial initiatives into reality, ensuring that the organisation remains at the forefront of military innovation and adaptability. By empowering individuals as change agents while simultaneously providing a supportive organisational framework, military organisations can foster a dynamic environment where bottom-up innovation thrives. This dual-pronged approach ensures that innovations are not only generated but are also effectively implemented and aligned with the organisation’s strategic objectives.

The quality process, which represents the traditional force-design pipeline, aligns with the principles of ISO 9001:2015, focusing on establishing a systematic approach to project management. It emphasises the importance of defining product and service requirements, managing design and development processes and ensuring product and service conformity. In a military context, this translates to rigorous planning and execution of force-design, ensuring that military capabilities meet current operational requirements and standards.

Conversely, the (bottom-up) Innovation Funnel is steered by the guidelines of ISO 56002:2019. This standard provides a blueprint for customising innovation processes to cater to distinct initiatives, offering the latitude for adaptability and agility in cultivating new solutions and enhancing operational capabilities.

The transition from (bottom-up) innovation to force-design planning and execution is a critical juncture in military modern strategic planning. This process harmonises the innovative outputs from the innovation funnel with the structured, rigorous requirements of traditional force-design pipeline.

Transition into the Force-Design: mature initiatives from the innovation funnel must be systematically incorporated into the military’s project quality pipeline, ensuring that new technologies and capabilities are not only innovative but also reliable and suitable for operational deployment.

The proposed framework not only mirrors the conceptual strategy underpinning the IDF’s institutionalised innovation management system but also serves as the foundation for its adoption across Israel’s broader defense ecosystem. This includes pivotal agencies such as the Mossad, Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), Israel Police, Prison Service, the Ministry of Homeland Security, etc. Beyond its institutional impact, this framework’s principles were also integrated into the guidelines of the Israeli first national innovation competition launched in late 2023.⁴⁵ This event marks a significant milestone, showcasing the framework’s effectiveness in promoting a culture of innovation and fostering bottom-up innovation within and beyond military confines.