<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the <italic>fault of</italic> the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them.</p></abstract>

This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the fault of the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them.

Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame

Eötvös Loránd Research Network, Budapest, Eötvös Loránd University

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame"}

This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the...

Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame

Publié en ligne: 13 mars 2021

Pages: 371 - 394

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0018

Mots clés
blame, conative theory, fault-judgments, irrational blame, punishment

© 2020 László Bernáth, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame

Publié en ligne: 13 mars 2021

Pages: 371 - 394

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0018

Mots clésblame, conative theory, fault-judgments, irrational blame, punishment

© 2020 László Bernáth, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
blame, conative theory, fault-judgments, irrational blame, punishment