<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.</p></abstract>

I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.

Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization"}

I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means...

Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

Publié en ligne: 29 janv. 2021

Pages: 209 - 222

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0010

Mots clés
Co-referential names, formalization, logical constants, logical form, truth conditions

© 2020 Mario Gómez-Torrente, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate Formalization

Publié en ligne: 29 janv. 2021

Pages: 209 - 222

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0010

Mots clésCo-referential names, formalization, logical constants, logical form, truth conditions

© 2020 Mario Gómez-Torrente, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Co-referential names, formalization, logical constants, logical form, truth conditions