<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.</p></abstract>

Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.

Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism"}

Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views,...

Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 219 - 232

Reçu: 19 juil. 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0013

Mots clés
Pragmatism, inferentialism, defeasible reasoning, particularism, occasion-sensitivity

© 2016 Javier González de Prado Salas, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 219 - 232

Reçu: 19 juil. 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0013

Mots clésPragmatism, inferentialism, defeasible reasoning, particularism, occasion-sensitivity

© 2016 Javier González de Prado Salas, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Pragmatism, inferentialism, defeasible reasoning, particularism, occasion-sensitivity