<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.</p></abstract>

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"What it is to be an Intentional Object"}

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved....

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 93 - 112

Reçu: 12 nov. 2015

Accepté: 19 avr. 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0004

Mots clés
Intentional objects, intentionality, Tim Crane, entity, existence

© 2016 Nicola Spinelli, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 93 - 112

Reçu: 12 nov. 2015

Accepté: 19 avr. 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0004

Mots clésIntentional objects, intentionality, Tim Crane, entity, existence

© 2016 Nicola Spinelli, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Intentional objects, intentionality, Tim Crane, entity, existence