<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent’s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney’s criticisms, arguing that Tanney fails to provide a philosophically satisfying or psychologically realistic account of reason-explanation of action.</p></abstract>

The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent’s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney’s criticisms, arguing that Tanney fails to provide a philosophically satisfying or psychologically realistic account of reason-explanation of action.

The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action"}

The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who...

The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 73 - 88

Reçu: 25 févr. 2009

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2009-0001

Mots clés
Reason-explanations, folk psychology, action theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology

© 2009 Andrei A. Buckareff et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 73 - 88

Reçu: 25 févr. 2009

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2009-0001

Mots clésReason-explanations, folk psychology, action theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology

© 2009 Andrei A. Buckareff et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Reason-explanations, folk psychology, action theory, philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology