<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski’s achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson’s critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to the Carnapian theory of meaning also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tarskian theory of reference.</p></abstract>

In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski’s achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson’s critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to the Carnapian theory of meaning also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tarskian theory of reference.

Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics"}

In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large...

Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 25 - 37

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2004-0002

© 2019 Ricardo Santos, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.