<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>It has turned out that all voting rules fail on some intuitively plausible desiderata. This has led some political scientists to argue that the notion of the will of the people is profoundly ambiguous and the absence of voting equilibria a generic state of a airs. As a constructive remedy to this some authors have introduced the idea of <italic>deliberative democracy</italic>. This view of democracy has much to recommend itself, most importantly the emphasis on individuals in devising the decision alternatives. Some empirical evidence also suggests that the deliberative institutions provide an escape from some of the most notorious incompatibility results in social choice theory. We shall critically examine this suggestion. The view emerging from this examination is that social choice theory and deliberative democracy are complementary, not competing approaches to democratic decision making.</p>
</abstract>

It has turned out that all voting rules fail on some intuitively plausible desiderata. This has led some political scientists to argue that the notion of the will of the people is profoundly ambiguous and the absence of voting equilibria a generic state of a airs. As a constructive remedy to this some authors have introduced the idea of deliberative democracy. This view of democracy has much to recommend itself, most importantly the emphasis on individuals in devising the decision alternatives. Some empirical evidence also suggests that the deliberative institutions provide an escape from some of the most notorious incompatibility results in social choice theory. We shall critically examine this suggestion. The view emerging from this examination is that social choice theory and deliberative democracy are complementary, not competing approaches to democratic decision making.

Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science

Control and Cybernetics

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy"}

It has turned out that all voting rules fail on some intuitively plausible desiderata. This has led some political scientists to argue that the notion of the...

Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy

Publié en ligne: 12 août 2022

Pages: 137 - 149

Reçu: 01 mars 2022

Accepté: 01 avr. 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/candc-2022-0011

Mots clés
choice desiderata, domain restriction, incompatibility result, single-peakedness, voting rule

© 2022 Hannu Nurmi, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy

Publié en ligne: 12 août 2022

Pages: 137 - 149

Reçu: 01 mars 2022

Accepté: 01 avr. 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/candc-2022-0011

Mots cléschoice desiderata, domain restriction, incompatibility result, single-peakedness, voting rule

© 2022 Hannu Nurmi, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
choice desiderata, domain restriction, incompatibility result, single-peakedness, voting rule