<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>Frequentists and Bayesians disagree about the soundness of performing calculations based, in an important part, on prior information. The disagreement goes back to a basic philosophical disagreement about how to conceptualize the meaning of probability. As frequentists and Bayesians use the term differently, there is a basic philosophical incommensurability. However, this philosophical incommensurability need not imply an empirical incommensurability. It is possible for there to be, simultaneously, philosophical incommensurability and empirical commensurability. This possibility implies consequences that this article discusses.</p>
</abstract>

Frequentists and Bayesians disagree about the soundness of performing calculations based, in an important part, on prior information. The disagreement goes back to a basic philosophical disagreement about how to conceptualize the meaning of probability. As frequentists and Bayesians use the term differently, there is a basic philosophical incommensurability. However, this philosophical incommensurability need not imply an empirical incommensurability. It is possible for there to be, simultaneously, philosophical incommensurability and empirical commensurability. This possibility implies consequences that this article discusses.

Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking

Econometrics

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Frequentists and Bayesians disagree about the soundness of performing calculations based, in an important part, on prior information. The disagreement goes...

Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking

Publié en ligne: 12 mai 2021

Pages: 25 - 48

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15611/eada.2021.1.02

Mots clés
incommensurability, commensurability, a priori procedure, estimation, hypothesis testing, Bayes factors

© 2021 David Trafimow, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking

Publié en ligne: 12 mai 2021

Pages: 25 - 48

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15611/eada.2021.1.02

Mots clésincommensurability, commensurability, a priori procedure, estimation, hypothesis testing, Bayes factors

© 2021 David Trafimow, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
incommensurability, commensurability, a priori procedure, estimation, hypothesis testing, Bayes factors