<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by seeing them as faultless. However, we can show that this advantage is made possible by systematically disagreeing with moral phenomenology. Relativists make a substantial distinction between intercultural and intracultural discourses which turns out to be incoherent. This can be shown by making use of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command.</p></abstract>

Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by seeing them as faultless. However, we can show that this advantage is made possible by systematically disagreeing with moral phenomenology. Relativists make a substantial distinction between intercultural and intracultural discourses which turns out to be incoherent. This can be shown by making use of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command.

Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth"}

Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to realism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagreements by...

Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth

Publié en ligne: 26 nov. 2015

Pages: 7 - 16

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0027

Mots clés
relativism, metaethics, cognitive command, truth in ethics, disagreement

© Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Disagreement, Cognitive Command, and the Indexicality of Moral Truth

Publié en ligne: 26 nov. 2015

Pages: 7 - 16

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0027

Mots clésrelativism, metaethics, cognitive command, truth in ethics, disagreement

© Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Mots clés
relativism, metaethics, cognitive command, truth in ethics, disagreement