<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and especially his account of impossible objects has proved itself to be decisive in a wide range of fields, from logic up to ontology of fiction. Rejecting the traditional ‘prejudice in favour of the real’, Meinong investigates what there is <italic>not:</italic> a peculiar non-existing object is precisely the fictional object, which exemplifies a number of properties (like Sherlock Holmes, who lives in Baker Street and is an outstanding detective) without existing in the same way as flesh-and-blood detectives do. Fictional objects are in some sense <italic>incomplete</italic> objects, whose core of constituent properties is not completely determined. Now, what does it imply to hold that a fictional object may also occur in true statements? We shall deal with the objections raised by Russell and Quine against Meinong’s view, pointing out limits and advantages of both perspectives.</p></abstract>

Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and especially his account of impossible objects has proved itself to be decisive in a wide range of fields, from logic up to ontology of fiction. Rejecting the traditional ‘prejudice in favour of the real’, Meinong investigates what there is not: a peculiar non-existing object is precisely the fictional object, which exemplifies a number of properties (like Sherlock Holmes, who lives in Baker Street and is an outstanding detective) without existing in the same way as flesh-and-blood detectives do. Fictional objects are in some sense incomplete objects, whose core of constituent properties is not completely determined. Now, what does it imply to hold that a fictional object may also occur in true statements? We shall deal with the objections raised by Russell and Quine against Meinong’s view, pointing out limits and advantages of both perspectives.

Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real

University of Rome Tor Vergata, DAAD Fellow 2015/16 – FU Berlin

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real"}

Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and...

Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real

Publié en ligne: 25 janv. 2017

Pages: 56 - 72

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0017

Mots clés
Ontology of fiction, Meinong, classical quantification, Quine, meta-ontology

© 2016 Cristina Travanini, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real

Publié en ligne: 25 janv. 2017

Pages: 56 - 72

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0017

Mots clésOntology of fiction, Meinong, classical quantification, Quine, meta-ontology

© 2016 Cristina Travanini, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Ontology of fiction, Meinong, classical quantification, Quine, meta-ontology