<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.</p></abstract>

In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

Professore Ordinario, University of Torino

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances"}

In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one...

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

Publié en ligne: 25 janv. 2017

Pages: 28 - 55

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0016

Mots clés
fiction/nonfiction, fictional/nonfictional works, utterance approach, minimally contextualist account, metarepresentation

© 2016 Aberto Voltolini, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

Publié en ligne: 25 janv. 2017

Pages: 28 - 55

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0016

Mots clésfiction/nonfiction, fictional/nonfictional works, utterance approach, minimally contextualist account, metarepresentation

© 2016 Aberto Voltolini, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
fiction/nonfiction, fictional/nonfictional works, utterance approach, minimally contextualist account, metarepresentation