<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.</p></abstract>

The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.

Modification of Shapley Value and its Implementation in Decision Making

Foundations of Management

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Modification of Shapley Value and its Implementation in Decision Making"}

The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5...

Modification of Shapley Value and its Implementation in Decision Making

Publié en ligne: 28 oct. 2017

Pages: 257 - 272

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/fman-2017-0020

Mots clés
characteristic function, coalition, cooperative game, core of game, imputation, Shapley value

© Faculty of Management, Warsaw University of Technology

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Modification of Shapley Value and its Implementation in Decision Making

Publié en ligne: 28 oct. 2017

Pages: 257 - 272

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/fman-2017-0020

Mots cléscharacteristic function, coalition, cooperative game, core of game, imputation, Shapley value

© Faculty of Management, Warsaw University of Technology

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Mots clés
characteristic function, coalition, cooperative game, core of game, imputation, Shapley value