<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> Conventional wisdom suggests that the power to do otherwise is necessary for being morally responsible. While much of the literature on alternative possibilities has focused on Frankfurt’s argument against this claim, I instead focus on one of Dennett’s (1984) arguments against it. This argument appeals to cases of volitional necessity rather than cases featuring counterfactual interveners. van Inwagen (1989) and Kane (1996) appeal to the notion of ‘character setting’ to argue that these cases do not show that the power to do otherwise is unnecessary for moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that their character setting response is unsuccessful.</p></abstract>

Conventional wisdom suggests that the power to do otherwise is necessary for being morally responsible. While much of the literature on alternative possibilities has focused on Frankfurt’s argument against this claim, I instead focus on one of Dennett’s (1984) arguments against it. This argument appeals to cases of volitional necessity rather than cases featuring counterfactual interveners. van Inwagen (1989) and Kane (1996) appeal to the notion of ‘character setting’ to argue that these cases do not show that the power to do otherwise is unnecessary for moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that their character setting response is unsuccessful.

Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

{"article-title":"Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting"}

Conventional wisdom suggests that the power to do otherwise is necessary for being morally responsible. While much of the literature on alternative...

Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting

Publié en ligne: 06 mars 2018

Pages: 287 - 307

Reçu: 27 juil. 2017

Accepté: 11 févr. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0008

Mots clés
Alternative possibilities, moral responsibility, character setting, volitional necessity, free will

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting

Publié en ligne: 06 mars 2018

Pages: 287 - 307

Reçu: 27 juil. 2017

Accepté: 11 févr. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0008

Mots clésAlternative possibilities, moral responsibility, character setting, volitional necessity, free will

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Mots clés
Alternative possibilities, moral responsibility, character setting, volitional necessity, free will