<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.</p></abstract>

Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate.

Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock"}

Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It...

Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock

Publié en ligne: 06 mars 2018

Pages: 219 - 243

Reçu: 27 juil. 2017

Accepté: 11 févr. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0005

Mots clés
Compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, non-reductive physicalism, supervenient libertarianism

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Supervenient Freedom and the Free Will Deadlock

Publié en ligne: 06 mars 2018

Pages: 219 - 243

Reçu: 27 juil. 2017

Accepté: 11 févr. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0005

Mots clésCompatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, non-reductive physicalism, supervenient libertarianism

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Mots clés
Compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, non-reductive physicalism, supervenient libertarianism