<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.</p></abstract>

This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.

Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination"}

This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are...

Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination

Publié en ligne: 06 mars 2018

Pages: 193 - 217

Reçu: 27 juil. 2017

Accepté: 11 févr. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0004

Mots clés
Freedom, possibilities, abilities, overdetermination, preemption

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Alternative Possibilities and Causal Overdetermination

Publié en ligne: 06 mars 2018

Pages: 193 - 217

Reçu: 27 juil. 2017

Accepté: 11 févr. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0004

Mots clésFreedom, possibilities, abilities, overdetermination, preemption

© 2018

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Mots clés
Freedom, possibilities, abilities, overdetermination, preemption