Case 1:ps(v) = 0 and 0 < pp(v) ≤ 1 g(b) = Pp(b + c)[U(–c\r) – U(0|r)] | g(0) = pp(v)[U(–c|r) – U(0|r)] < 0 | EUy < EUN′ incentives to vote “no” |
Case 1: ps(v) = 1 and 0 < pp(v).≤1 g(b) = [1 – pp(b + c)] U(b +c|r) + pp(b + c) U(b|r) – U(0|r) | g(0) = [1–pp(v)[U(c|r) – U(0|r)] > 0 | EUy > EUN′ incentives to vote “yes” |
Case 1: pp(v) = 0 and 0 < ps(v) < 1 g(b) = p(b + c)[U(b + c|r) – U(0|r)] | g(0) = ps(v)[U(c|r) – U(0|r)] > 0 | EUy > EUN′ incentives to vote “yes” |
Case 1:pp(v) = 1 and 0 < ps(v) < 1 g(b) = [1 – ps(b + c)] U(–c|r) + ps(b + c)U(b\r) – U(0|r) | g(0) = [1 – ps(v)][U(–c\r) – U(0|r)] < 0 | EUy < EUN′ incentives to vote “no” |