[Akiyama, E. and Kaneko, K. (2000). Dynamical systems game theory and dynamics of games, Physica D147(3–4): 221–258.10.1016/S0167-2789(00)00157-3]Search in Google Scholar
[Anderlini, L. (1999). Communication, computability, and common interest games, Games and Economic Behavior27(1): 1–37.10.1006/game.1998.0652]Search in Google Scholar
[Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books New York, New York, NY.]Search in Google Scholar
[Binmore, K. (1996). A note on backward induction, Games and Economic Behavior17(1): 135–137.10.1006/game.1996.0098]Search in Google Scholar
[Blackwell, C. and McKee, M. (2003). Only for my own neighborhood? Preferences and voluntary provision of local and global public goods, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization52(1): 115–131.10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00178-6]Search in Google Scholar
[Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. and Richerson, P.J. (2003). The evolution of altruistic punishment, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences100(6): 3531–3535.10.1073/pnas.063044310015232712631700]Search in Google Scholar
[Brembs, B. (1996). Chaos, cheating and cooperation: Potential solutions to the prisoner’s dilemma, Oikos76(1): 14–24.10.2307/3545744]Search in Google Scholar
[Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.]Search in Google Scholar
[Cason, T.N. and Mui, V.-L. (1998). Social influence in the sequential dictator game, Journal of Mathematical Psychology42(2–3): 248–265.10.1006/jmps.1998.12139710550]Search in Google Scholar
[Chen, X. and Deng, X. (2006). Settling the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium, 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS’06, Berkeley, CA, USA, pp. 261–272.]Search in Google Scholar
[Dong, H. and Dai, Z. (2011). A multi intersections signal coordinate control method based on game theory, 2011 International Conference on Electronics, Communications and Control (ICECC), Ningbo, China, pp. 1232–1235.]Search in Google Scholar
[Doniec, A., Mandiau, R., Piechowiak, S. and Espié, S. (2008). A behavioral multi-agent model for road traffic simulation, Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence21(8): 1443–1454.10.1016/j.engappai.2008.04.002]Search in Google Scholar
[Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature415(6868): 137–140.10.1038/415137a11805825]Search in Google Scholar
[Fehr, E. and Gintis, H. (2007). Human motivation and social cooperation: Experimental and analytical foundations, Annual Review of Sociology33: 43–64.10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812]Search in Google Scholar
[Fehr, E. and Leibbrandt, A. (2011). A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons, Journal of Public Economics95(9–10): 1144–1155.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.013]Search in Google Scholar
[Gintis, H. (2000). Game Theory Evolving—A Problem-centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction, 1st Edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.]Search in Google Scholar
[Helbing, D., Schönhof, M., Stark, H.-U. and Holyst, J.A. (2005). How individuals learn to take turns: Emergence of alternating cooperation in a congestion game and the prisoner’s dilemma, Advances in Complex Systems8(1): 87–116.10.1142/S0219525905000361]Search in Google Scholar
[Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9781139173179]Search in Google Scholar
[Jones, P.J.S. (2006). Collective action problems posed by no-take zones, Marine Policy30(2): 143–156.10.1016/j.marpol.2004.10.003]Search in Google Scholar
[Koller, D., Megiddo, N. and von Stengel, B. (1996). Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games, Games and Economic Behavior14(2): 247–259, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825696900512.]Search in Google Scholar
[Lau, S.-H. and Mui, V.-L. (2012). Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2×2 games, Theory and Decision72(2): 167–188, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9249-4.10.1007/s11238-011-9249-4]Search in Google Scholar
[López-Pérez, R. (2008). Aversion to norm-breaking: A model, Games and Economic Behavior64(1): 237–267.10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.009]Search in Google Scholar
[Mariano, P. and Correia, L. (2002a). The effect of agreements in a game with multiple strategies for cooperation, in R. Standish, M.A. Bedau and H.A. Abbass (Eds.), Artificial Life VIII: Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Artificial Life, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 375–378.]Search in Google Scholar
[Mariano, P. and Correia, L. (2002b). A game to study coordination and cooperation, 5th Workshop on Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies, Bologna, Italy, pp. 101–112.]Search in Google Scholar
[Mariano, P. and Correia, L. (2003). A resource sharing model to study social behaviours, Progress in Artificial Intelligence—11th Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence, EPIA 2003, Beja, Portugal, pp. 84–88.]Search in Google Scholar
[McCarter, M.W., Budescu, D.V. and Scheffran, J. (2011). The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes116(1): 83–95.10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.002]Search in Google Scholar
[McKelvey, R.D. and Palfrey, T.R. (1992). An experimental study of the centipede game, Econometrica60(4): 803–836.10.2307/2951567]Search in Google Scholar
[Nicolò, A. and Yu, Y. (2008). Strategic divide and choose, Games and Economic Behavior64(1): 268–289.10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.006]Search in Google Scholar
[Nowak, M., Bonhoeffer, S. and May, R. (1994). Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences91(11): 4877–4881.10.1073/pnas.91.11.4877438928197150]Search in Google Scholar
[Ottone, S. (2008). Are people Samaritans or Avengers?, Economics Bulletin3(10): 1–3.]Search in Google Scholar
[Papadimitriou, C.H. (1994). On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence, Journal of Computer and System Sciences48(3): 498–532. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022000005800637.]Search in Google Scholar
[Rosenthal, R.W. (1981). Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox, Journal of Economic Theory25(1): 92–100, http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v25y1981i1p92-100.html.]Search in Google Scholar
[Rowland, M. (2005). A framework for resolving the transboundary water allocation conflict conundrum, Ground Water43(5): 700–705.10.1111/j.1745-6584.2005.00066.x]Search in Google Scholar
[Shapley, L.S. (1953). Stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences39(10): 1095–1100, http://www.pnas.org/content/39/10/1095.short.]Search in Google Scholar
[Shoham, Y. and Leyton-Brown, K. (2009). Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-theoretic and Logical Foundations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.10.1017/CBO9780511811654]Search in Google Scholar
[Sigmund, K., Hauert, C. and Nowak, M.A. (2001). Reward and punishment in minigames, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences98(19): 10757–10762.10.1073/pnas.161155698]Search in Google Scholar
[Sutter, M. and Strassmair, C. (2009). Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments—an experimental study, Games and Economic Behavior66(1): 506–525.10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.014]Search in Google Scholar
[van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J. and van Winden, F. (2002). Social ties in a public good experiment, Journal of Public Economics85(2): 275–299.10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00090-1]Search in Google Scholar
[Velez, M.A., Stranlund, J.K. and Murphy, J.J. (2009). What motivates common pool resource users? Experimental evidence from the field, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization70(3): 485–497.10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.008]Search in Google Scholar
[Wallace, J.S., Acreman, M.C. and Sullivan, C.A. (2003). The sharing of water between society and ecosystems: from conflict to catchment-based co-management, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences358(1440): 2011–2026.10.1098/rstb.2003.1383169329014728795]Search in Google Scholar
[Ward, H. (1998). A game theoretic analysis of the politics of taking it in turns, British Journal of Political Science28(2): 355–387.]Search in Google Scholar