<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> This article seeks to define a certain form of exceptionalism - missionist exceptionalism - and ask to what extent it applies to Russia. The method will be a broad comparative analysis. The core argument is that missionist exceptionalism is fundamentally paradoxical; that polities make largely similar claims about themselves while pleading sui generis uniqueness. This hypothesis is asserted by examining the exceptionalism of other polities. These are two rivals of Russia; the United States and Poland, a “sentimental ally” of Russia, Serbia, and a country with a deep and interesting relationship with Russia, Israel.</abstract>

Russian Exceptionalism: a Comparative Perspective

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The essay examines Vladimir Putin’s civilisational discourse, which arose in earnest with the publication of his presidential campaign articles in 2012. It argues that what makes Putin’s rendering of Russia’s civilisational identity distinctive is its strongly emphasized Statism, understood as a belief in the primacy of the state. This suggests that while his endorsement of a distinct civilisational identity represents an important conceptual turn as regards how national identity is articulated, there are also significant lines of continuity with previous presidential periods, given that state primacy has been at the heart of Putin’s political agenda since the very beginning of his presidential career. This detail also reveals a great deal about the political rationale behind Putin’s commitment to a Russian civilisational identity. It provides the government with a theoretical justification of an illiberal political course. There are important implications for foreign policy-making as well. In relation to the West, there is an attempt to limit its normative reach by depicting liberal values as less than universal. In regional affairs, Russia is attempting to legitimate its involvement in the near abroad on civilisational grounds. The loose definition of ‘co-patriots’ as foreign nationals experiencing some affinity with Russia gives it plenty of leeway in this regard. Lastly, Russia has petitioned for Ukraine’s neutrality based on the argument that the country is straddling a civilisational fault line.</abstract>

State Civilisation: The Statist Core of Vladimir Putin’s Civilisational Discourse and Its Implications for Russian Foreign Policy

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The crisis in Ukraine, that broke out in 2013 and escalated in 2014, has led to sanction policy and the emergence of significant political divergences between Russian Federation and the West. This has resulted in an intensification of Russia’s foreign and economic policy alliances with its neighboring countries as well as with the rest of the BRICS members. In his interview with Cuba’s Prensa Latina, Vladimir Putin further classified cooperation with Latin American states as one of the key and very promising lines of Russia’s foreign policy.In light of the above mentioned developments, this paper addresses the Latin American vector of Russian foreign policy using the example of Russian-Venezuelan partnership, which has been intensified after 2004. It explores the underlying key elements of this partnership based on realist and constructivist assumptions and is aimed at outlining foreign policy identities, perceptions and interests constitutive for the cooperation between the two countries. The author concludes, that the cooperation is based both on realist and constructivist elements, whereas Russian interests are mainly realist and Venezuelan constructivist, and that fact could hinder long-lasting and both-way beneficial bilateral collaboration.</abstract>

Latin American vector in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Identities and interests in the Russian‑Venezuelan Partnership

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Since President Barack Obama set the end of 2014 as the deadline to complete the planned troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, numerous commentators have sought to assess Russia’s Afghan policy since September 11, 2001 and anticipate Moscow’s strategy in ‘post-2014’ Afghanistan. This paper maintains that an assessment/evaluation of Afghanistan’s significance for Russia in the current system of international relations is needed to understand Moscow’s current and future Afghan strategy. Hence, the aim of this study is to identify and analyse the major factors, which lead to a conceptualization of Russia’s interests in Afghanistan. When assessing Russia’s interests in Afghanistan, one must take into account a plethora of significant issues, including Putin’s ‘great-power’ rhetoric; geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic rivalries in the wider region; security threats such as the illegal narcotics emanating from Afghanistan and global terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism; the rivalry and competition for energy resources; and control over pipeline routes and energy corridors. The analysis of these substantiating factors demonstrate why in the 21st century the Afghan problem remains a significant challenge to Russia’s ‘great power’ identity, to its international strategy abroad, to its strategically important ‘near abroad,’ and to the country’s domestic socio-economic policy</abstract>

Afghanistan’s significance for Russia in the 21st Century: Interests, Perceptions and Perspectives

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">The Caucasus played a prominent role in the Russian foreign policy for a long time, which has not changed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Beginning with four general hypothesis about Russia’s interests in its “near abroad” the essays gives an insights in the current status and developments in the relations between Russia and its southern neighbors Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. A special focus is on the frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Naghorno-Karabakh and Russia’s role in these conflicts.</abstract>

Russia’s backyard – unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Since 2012 and with Putin’s return to the presidency, Russian politics underwent a process of securitization of domestic politics. This laid the groundwork for the crisis in European-Russian relations that culminated in the ‘Ukraine crisis’ from late 2013. This article will trace the domestic determinants of Russian foreign policy choices and narratives since 2012 that help explain the political deadlock between ‘the West’ and Russia over the European Union’s ‘Eastern Partnership’. It will thereby also analyze the effects for the Russian perception of agency between the US and the EU as well as path dependencies that European Union sanctions have created. Not only Russia’s relationship with the West is at stake in this stand-off. The ‘Ukraine crisis’ has developed into a fundamental systemic crisis of the Putinite regime. Only if Putin’s ‘social contract’, which had guaranteed economic well-being in exchange for political inactivity, was to be eroded by sanctions imposed on Russia, the ‘civilizational’ narrative of Russian exclusivity would be endangered. A new social contract will be a generational task and will have to take stock of the nexus between internal determinants and identitarian foreign policy choices. It will also be the first step in recalibrating European-Russia relations.</abstract>

The Construction of Crisis: The ‘internal‑identitarian’ nexus in Russian‑European relations and its significance beyond the Ukraine crisis

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">In this paper, we borrow the dramaturgical analysis from sociologists and use it to analyze how contemporary Russian elites communicate with the public. It is my goal to analyze the performance of the Russian political elite when presenting the changes caused by the worsening Russo-Western relations over the Ukrainian crisis to the domestic audiences, with focus on the impact of sanctions introduced by the Western countries last year. Which strategies, narratives and symbols remain the same and which are adjusted, erased or newly introduced by the political elite when communicating with the public in order to justify the contemporary situation? We will focus especially on two basic components of the narrative: the symbolic level, particularly the use of history, geopolitics and other symbolic topics to frame the current situation; the pragmatic level, especially adjustment of current strategies and introduction of new plans and partners who will help to manage the new situation. As we will clarify later, our analysis will focus on symbolic arguments used by Vladimir Putin as “the national leader” and pragmatic politics introduced by him as “the president”.</abstract>

Sanctions in Russian Political Narrative

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Information warfare became a topic of a heated discussion with the advancement of the Russian state on the territory of the neighbouring Ukraine. Already forgotten since the collapse of the Soviet Union discourse about the Cold War made a rapid comeback into the media and public discourse creating confusion among readers. Hence, this article aims to clarify the relevant terminology when it comes to the use of information operations in Russia as well as to point out the importance of mediated narratives. By relying on Russian military thought, the article sheds some light on the importance of narratives such as: Russia-West confrontation and hybrid wars, Russian history and identity, and Russian patriotism.</abstract>

Narratives of Russia’s “Information Wars”

<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">Based on a geographical-administrative definition of the region, the theoretical assumptions of contemporary French structuralist geopolitics, cross-sectional data for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 from the Updated Arctic Regional Attributes Dataset, and the technical capabilities of MS Office Excel 2010, this research (a) reveals and contrasts the Arctic states’ capability constraints deriving from their longitudinal material and virtual power potential (physical potential, socio-economic potential, military potential, and symbolic potential); and (b) analyses the role of this constraint in the process of preference formation in case of one specific Arctic actor, Russia, in the Arctic territorial dispute. This study confirms that Russia’s capability constraint is the lowest in the region and that the latter does not form a stable trend throughout the period studied. It also suggests the preference formation framework for Russia in the Arctic dispute based on the evolution of its polar capability constraint.</abstract>

The Power of the Capability Constraint: On Russia’s Strength in the Arctic Territorial Dispute

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Politics in Central Europe

 POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE publishes original, double-blind, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. The essays should contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.  The journal does not have article processing charges (APCs) nor article submission charges.  Archiving  Sciendo archives the contents of this journal in Portico - digital long-term preservation service of scholarly books, journals and collections.  Plagiarism Policy  The editorial board is participating in a growing community of Similarity Check System's users in order to ensure that the content published is original and trustworthy. Similarity Check is a medium that allows for comprehensive manuscripts screening, aimed to eliminate plagiarism and provide a high standard and quality peer-review process. 